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"DEMOCRATIC DESPOTISM" AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EX POST
FACTO CLAIMS IN STATE COURTS
Wayne A. Logan*
This Article explores the history of the Ex Post Facto Clause, including the
Supreme Court's seminal 1798 decision in Calder v. Bull, and analyzes the results
of a survey of expostfacto claims decided in state courts from 1992-2002, the first
study to catalog the types of claims generated among the states, and the
institutional response of state courts to them. The author provides an overview of
the claims resolved in state courts, examining the nature of the laws challenged,
how the challenges fared, and the rationales used by courts in their dispositions.
Discussion focuses on two abiding sources of confusion in ex post facto
jurisprudence: the interpretation of the categories of laws the Calder decision
prescribed as being ex post facto, and the ongoing uncertainty over the definition
and treatment of laws deemed procedural (as opposed to substantive) in nature.
These areas of uncertainty, it is argued, not only inspire confusion among the
courts, but also serve to undermine the crucial structural role of the Ex Post Facto
Clause itself- intended by the Framers to guard against thepotentpoliticalforces
motivating state legislatures to adopt criminal laws with retroactive effect.
INTRODUCIION
During the last week of its October 2002 term, the Supreme Court issued a
number of long-awaited decisions, addressing such politically charged issues as
affirmative action in higher education,' the criminalization of same-sex consensual
* Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Special thanks to Professors
Harold Krent, David Logan, and Ron Wright for comments and suggestions; Sarah Boswell-
Healey for research assistance; Meg Daniel for editorial help; Kerrin Wolf for publication
expertise; and the William Mitchell College of Law Faculty Research Fund for financial
support.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (invalidating affirmative action admissions
program employed by the University of Michigan Office of Undergraduate Admissions on
equal protection grounds); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (upholding
affirmative action admissions program employed by the University of Michigan Law School
against equal protection challenge).
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sodomy,2 and the First Amendment rights of public library patrons to access the
Internet without governmental interference.3 Taken together, the decisions fully
warranted media assessments ofa "momentous" term,4 and the outcomes will surely
fuel related cultural wars for years to come. That same week the Court issued
another decision, which, although largely overshadowed by its high-profile
companions, is also well deserving of attention. In Stogner v. California, the Court
held that the Ex Post Facto Clause precluded California from prosecuting
individuals suspected of sexually abusing children, after the limitations period for
such prosecutions had expired.5 The five-to-four vote accrued to the immediate
benefit of hundreds of convicted and suspected sex offenders, including members
of the clergy who were only recently held accountable for decades-old child sexual
predations,6 and cast into doubt other recent efforts to revive expired prosecutions,
including those of Congress regarding aged allegations of terrorism.7
In reaching its controversial result, the Court gave effect to its structural role
contemplated by the Framers: exerting a brake on the "sudden and strong passions"
that provoke state legislatures to enact criminal laws with retroactive application.'
As it had three years before in Carmell v. Texas, when it invalidated a Texas law
retroactively easing the evidentiary burden of government in prosecuting sex
2 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (invalidating Texas law criminalizing
"deviate sexual intercourse" on substantive due process grounds).
' United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct 2297 (2003) (upholding the Children's
Internet Protection Act, which conditions the receipt of federal funds on a requirement that
public libraries install software that blocks obscene and child pornographic materials).
4 Linda Greenhouse, In a Momentous Term, Justices Remake the Law, and the Court,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 1,2003, at Al.
5 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003).
6 John M. Broder, Victims Angered and Upset byRuling FreeingMolesters, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2003, at A12 (discussing release of convicted Roman Catholic priests as a result of
Stogner).
' Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Debate on Extending a Statute ofLimitations, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003, at A14 (discussing law passed by Congress allowing terrorism
prosecutions beyond the expired statute of limitations).
s See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38 (1810):
Whatever respect might have been felt for the state sovereignties, it is not to be
disguised that the fiamers of the constitution viewed, with some apprehension,
the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment; and that the
people of the United States, in adopting that instnment, have manifested a
determination to shield themselves... from the effects of those sudden and
strong passions to which men are exposed. The restrictions on the legislative
power of the states are obviously founded in this sentiment....
See also Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 322 (1866) (noting that "[i]t was
against the excited action of the States... that the framers of the Federal Constitution
intended to guard").
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offenders,9 the Court invoked the Ex Post Facto Clause in order to second-guess a
decision by a popularly elected state legislature, to the benefit of a notably
unpopular segment of the populace.' Much as it did in the wake of the Civil War
when states targeted Confederate sympathizers for retroactive punishment," the
Court in Stogner and Carmell voided laws enacted in impassioned, retributive
times - in this instance the 1990s 2 - an era in which sex offenders were singled
out for particular disdain and enjoyed paramount catalytic political value.' 3
The decisions, to be sure, should not be taken to signal any new special
fondness for criminal defendants, or sex offenders in particular, who otherwise
boast a notably dismal recent track record before the Court.' Rather, optimistically,
the decisions can be taken to manifest a willingness to breathe life into ex post facto
constraints, twice enshrined in Article I of the Constitution, 5 to limit the capacity
of Congress and state legislatures to enact retroactive criminal laws.' In both cases,
g 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
'0 See ADAM SAMPSON, ACTS OF ABUSE: SEX OFFENDERS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 124 (1994) (observing that the "vehemence of the hatred for sex offenders is
unmatched by attitudes to any other offenders").
" See Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277.
12 Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA
L. REV. 1751, 1752 (1999) (observing that "[w]e live in a repressive era when punishment
policies that would be unthinkable in other times and places are not only commonplace but
also are enthusiastically supported by public officials, policy intellectuals, and much of the
general public").
13 See generally Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L.
REv. 147, 161-67 (2000) (discussing rapid enactment of state and federal laws targeting sex
offenders, including those allowing for involuntary confinement and registration and
community notification); Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late
Modern America, 25 LAw & SOc. INQUIRY 1111, 1139-42 (2000) (describing political and
social forces inspiring registration and community notification laws).
14 Recent unsuccessful claims have included those challenging the post-imprisonment,
involuntary civil confinement of sex offenders; see Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002);
Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997);
registration and community notification; see Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1
(2003); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); and the refusal of prison authorities to extend the
Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination to inmates engaged in sex-
offender treatment; see McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002).
5 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I (providing that "[n]o State shall... pass any... ex
post facto Law"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (providing that "[n]o. . . ex post facto Law
shall be passed" by Congress).
"6 See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n.8 (1981) ("So much importance did the
[Convention] attach to [the ex post facto prohibition], that it is found twice in the
Constitution."). Because the discussion here focuses on the prohibition regarding the states,
the ex post facto bar is used in a singular sense.
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the conservative Rehnquist Court's avowed deference to majoritarianism and state
prerogative in formulating criminal justice policy took a back seat. 17 Almost as
important, the reasoning supporting the Court's decisions in both cases highlights
an important shift in emphasis - focusing less on the reliance and notice interests
of individual offenders that are jeopardized when criminal laws are retroactively
altered, and more on the arbitrariness of such governmental action.' It was this
same concern that prompted Justice Black to insist that "the Government should
turn square comers in dealing with the people" 9 - no matter how detestable their
acts.
While the 1990s, without question, marked a particularly active period of
aggressive legislative action on criminal justice-related matters, the proclivity for
and motives animating such laws were by no means new. The Court itself
acknowledged this political reality early on, in its seminal ex post facto decision
Calder v. Bull."° Upon surveying the variety of ex post facto laws known to the
Framers, it observed that:
The ground for the exercise of such legislative power was this, that the
safety of the kingdom depended on the death, or other punishment, of the
offender: as if traitors, when discovered, could be so formidable, or the
government so insecure! With very few exceptions, the advocates of
such laws were stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment, and
vindictive malice.2'
'7 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1187 (2003) (acknowledging the
Court's "traditional deference to legislative policy choices" of states in criminal justice
matters); see generally CHRISTOPHER E. SMrmI, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT (1997) (discussing changes to the criminal justice system as a result of the
Rehnquist Court); Stephen F. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal Procedure, 73 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1337 (2002) (discussing success of the Rehnquist Court in limiting, or
reversing, various holdings of the liberal Warren Court).
" As noted by the Carmell Court, all ex post facto laws have one thing in common: "In
each instance, the government refuses, after the fact, to play by its own rules, altering them
in a way that is advantageous only to the state.... ." Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533
(2000). For discussion of the Court's recent decisions in the area of retroactive civil
legislation, which can similarly be conceived as being based in governmental restraint, not
notice and reliance, see Debra Lyn Bassett, In the Wake ofSchoonerPeggy: Deconstructing
Legislative Retroactivity Analysis, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 453 (2001).
"9 St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208,229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
20 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
21 Id. at 389; cf Landsgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,266 (1994) (acknowledging
that a legislature's "responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to
use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or
individuals").
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With the dust now settling from a decade in which U.S. prison populations grew to
unprecedented proportions, 22 and legislators attached particular value to being
perceived as tough on crime,2 3 concern over the "democratic despotism 24 feared by
the Framers remains as warranted as ever.
' By year-end 2002, the number ofpersons incarcerated in the U.S. exceeded 2.1 million,
an all-time high. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS
IN 2002, at 1 (2003). The rate of incarceration for persons in prison or jail per 100,000
residents stood at 701, up from 458 in 1990. Id. The total number of persons under some
form of correctional supervision, whether incarcerated or under community supervision
pursuant to probation or parole, grew to nearly 6.6 million. LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATEs-2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN, at 1 (2002). In monetary terms, expenditures for correctional activities
nationwide grew at an equally alarming rate, almost doubling between 1990 and 1999. See
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE
STATISTIcs-2001, at 12, tbl. 1.8 (Ann L. Pastore & KathleenMaguire eds., 2002). Translated
into more human terms, during the 1990s, U.S. prisons and jails dispensed almost 16 million
'person-years" of incarceration, roughly 4.5 million more years than if confinement rates
would have remained unchanged after 1990. See HENRY RUTH & KEVIN R. REITZ, THE
CHAU.ENGEOF CRIME: RETHINmNG OUR RESPONSE 21 (2003). For an insightful examination
of the factors contributing to this aggressive resort to punitive severity, see David Cole, As
Freedom Advances: The Paradox of Severity in American Criminal Justice, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 455 (2001).
23 As Katherine Beckett has written, "crime and punishment have taken a front-row seat
in the theater of American political discourse." Katherine Beckett, Political Preoccupation
with CrimeLeads, Not Follows, Public Opinion, in PENALREFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES
40 (Michael Tonry ed., 2001). For more on the especially potent political ramifications of
criminal justice issues today, see KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLrrIcs (1997); DAvID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIErY (2001); JONATHAN
SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: CRIMINAL LAW AND THE RESHAPING OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 1965-2000 (forthcoming 2004); LORD WINDELSHAM, POLITICS, PUNISHMENT
AND POPULISM (1998); Harry A. Chernoffet al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
527 (1996); Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000).
24 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBUC 1776-1787, at
403-07 (1969). For more on this period of retroactive criminal law excesses, and the
concerns raised by early state laws in particular, see William Winslow Crosskey, The True
Meaning of the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex-Post-Facto Laws, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 539,
540-44 (1947); Robert W. Scheef, "Public Citizens " and the Constitution: Bridging the Gap
Between Popular Sovereignty and Original Intent, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2216-17
(2001); James Westfall Thompson, Anti-loyalist Legislation During the American
Revolution, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 81 (1908).
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This Article addresses the important judicial work that remains to be done if the
Ex Post Facto Clause is to fully regain its rightful place, in James Madison's words,
as a "constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights."2 In
particular, the Article reviews the results of a survey of the over 1,000 ex post facto
claims decided in state courts from 1992-2002, the f-u-st study to catalog the types
of claims generated among the states, and the institutional response of state courts
to them.
Part I surveys the historic underpinnings of the Ex Post Facto Clause and the
major decisions issued from Calder onward. As will be apparent, despite the
unequivocal clarity of the command that "[n]o State shall... pass any... ex post
facto Law,"'26 the Court has charted a quixotic and uncertain course in its ex post
factojurisprudence. More importantly, overtime, it has erected numerous obstacles
to the grant of relief on ex post facto grounds - obstacles at odds with the profound
suspicions prompting the Framers to include the prohibition in Article I of the
Constitution itself, a place otherwise mainly dedicated to specifying the architecture
and workings of government. Part HI provides an overview of the claims resolved
in state courts during the study period, examining the nature of the laws challenged,
how the challenges fared, and the rationales used by courts in their dispositions. In
Part I, the discussion focuses on two abiding sources of confusion in ex post facto
jurisprudence: the interpretation of the categories of laws the Calder decision
prescribed as being ex post facto, and the ongoing uncertainty over the definition
and treatment of laws deemed procedural (as opposed to substantive) in nature.
These areas of uncertainty, it will be argued, not only inspire confusion among the
courts, but also serve to undermine the crucial structural role of the Ex Post Facto
Clause itself- intended by the Framers to guard against the potent political forces
motivating state legislatures to adopt criminal laws with retroactive effect.
I. Ex POST FACrO CLAUSE ORIGINS AND CASE LAW
Although bias against retroactive laws is evidenced in thirteenth-century
English common law,27 and Greek and Roman law before that,28 in America such
concern was manifested in the early state constitutional 29 and then the federal
1 THE FEDERAUISTNO. 44, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
THEFEDERAUSTNO. 78, at466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (referring
to the Clause as a "specified exception[] to the legislative authority" that the courts must
enforce).
'6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
27 Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of
Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775,775-77 (1936).
28 Id. at 775-76.
z See Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders' View, 39 IDAHO L.
REv. 489, 504 (2003) (noting and discussing instances).
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constitutional debates. 30 Despite pleas by such notables as George Mason of
Virginia, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut,
predicated on the practical need of government on occasion to legislate
retroactively,3 abuses by the Crown and state governments alike galvanized efforts
to ban such laws. 2 The concerns took shape in Sections 9 and 10 of Article I of the
Constitution, prohibiting, respectively, Congress and state legislatures from
enacting retroactive laws.33
The prohibitions received their first judicial interpretation just over a decade
later in Calder v. Bull,34 a decision that governs ex post facto interpretation to this
day. In Calder, the Connecticut Legislature set aside a probate decree issued by a
local court and granted a new hearing on the construction of a will, after the
ordinary right to appeal had passed.3 Writing for the Court, Justice Chase
concluded that the decision by the probate court did not create a vested right on
behalf of Calder and his wife, and that the legislature, therefore, did not
retroactively disturb any recognized legal expectancy.3 Having concluded that the
laws of civil justice were not violated by Connecticut's action, Justice Chase
nonetheless went on to state that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not "prohibit...
depriving a citizen even of a vested right to property" because it solely prohibited
retroactive application of criminal laws in particular.37 Writing separately, Justices
Paterson" and Iredel 39 agreed that the ban extended only to criminal cases. To
Justice Iredell, "[i]t is only in criminal cases, indeed, in which the danger to be
30 See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
" See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 375-76, 435,439-40,
640 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter CONVENTION REcoRDs].
32 According to one Convention attendee, "experience overruled all other calculations."
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 31, at 376 (remarks of Daniel Carrol, Maryland).
Federalists advanced the ex post facto provisions as a main argument in favor of ratification,
in the absence of a Bill of Rights. See THE FEDERAUST NO. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the prohibition
of ex post facto laws, and Titles of Nobility... are perhaps greater securities to liberty and
republicanism than any [the Constitution] contains."). For a discussion of the several
constitutional provisions evincing the Framers' strong bias against retroactive legislation
more generally, with the Ex Post Facto Clause figuring chiefly, see Natelson, supra note 29,
at 515-27; Smead, supra note 27, at 789-93.
33 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text
4 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 386 (1798).
31 Id. at 386.
'6 Id. at 392.
17 Id. at 394.
" Id. at 395 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
'9 Id. at 398 (opinion of Iredell, J.). Justice Cushing also wrote separately but expressed
no opinion on the question. See id. at 400-01 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
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guarded against, is greatly to be apprehended." 4 Despite resolving that the Ex Post
Facto Clause was not applicable to the claim before the Court, three of the four
sitting Justices spoke at length, five years before Marbury v. Madison,4' on the
purpose and reach of the Ex Post Facto Clause in the regulation of state criminal
law making.42 Justice Chase surveyed "[a] few instances" of legislative activity
40 Id. at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.). For his part, Justice Paterson observed that if the Ex
Post Facto Clause reached all retroactive laws, then the Contracts Clause would be
superfluous. See id. at 397 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
For commentary in support of the contrary view that the Ex Post Facto Clause was
widely, if not uniformly, understood at the time of framing as applying to civil and criminal
laws alike see WILIjAM WINSLOw CRoSSKEY, I POLIrTcs AND THE CONSTrrurTON IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNrrED STATES 325-29 (1953); Jane Harris Aiken, Ex Post Facto in the
Civil Context: Unbridled Punishment, 81 Ky. L.J. 323 (1992); Crosskey, supra note 24;
Oliver Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 MICH. L. REV. 315 (1921); Breck P.
McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court of the United States, 15 CAL. L. REV.
269 (1927). But see Natelson, supra note 29, at 522 (noting ongoing negotiations among
Federalist and anti-Federalist camps and concluding that there existed "a public quasi-
consensus. . that the Ex Post Facto Clauses banned only criminal retroactivity").
According to Leonard Levy, Calder's limitation of the Ex Post Facto Clause to criminal
cases "was more innovative than it was an accurate reflection of the opinions of the Framers
and ratifiers. ... The Court in that case reinvented the law on the subject." LEONARD W.
LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMER's CONSTrrImON 74 (1988). One commentator
attributes the confusion to the fact that records of the Convention did not start becoming
available in published form until 1819, twenty-one years after Calder. McAllister, supra, at
270. Another notes that "only one" member of the Calder Court (Paterson) attended the
Convention, but the author fails to elaborate on why this would not suffice to illuminate other
members of the Court on such a central matter of constitutional interpretation. Field, supra,
at316.
"' For more on the seminal place ofMarburyin the pantheon ofjudicial review, see PAUL
W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERiCA
(1997); Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial
Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 Sup. CT. REV. 329 (1993); Marbury v.
Madison: A Bicentennial Symposium, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105 (2003). For a discussion of the
place of the Ex Post Facto Clause in attesting to the Framers' intended authorization of
judicial review more generally, see Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of
Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 947-51 (2003); see also DAVID P. CuRRE, THE
CONsTITUION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 41-49
(1992) (discussing the central place of Calder in the Court's early history).
42 According to Justice Chase, "[t]he prohibition . ..necessarily requires some
explanation; for, naked and without explanation, it is unintelligible, and means nothing.
Literally, it is only, that a law shall not be passed concerning, and after the fact, or thing
done, or action committed." Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390.
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exemplifying ex post facto abuses, and proceeded to set forth a menu of laws
coming within the prohibition:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and
receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender,4 3
According to Justice Chase, "[a]ll these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and
oppressive."
In its next major ex post facto decision, Cummings v. Missouri,45 the Court
addressed a provision of the Missouri Constitution approved in the wake of the
Civil War, which contained a "test oath" designed to ensure Union loyalty." Each
affiant was compelled to deny inter alia "that he ha[d] ever 'been in armed hostility
to the United States, or to the lawful authorities thereof, "' or "that he ha[d] ever, 'by
act or word,' manifested his adherence to the cause of the enemies of the United
States, foreign or domestic."47 The Missouri provision further provided that any
individual who refused to take the oath would be barred from "any office of honor,
trust, or profit."'4 Cummings, a Roman Catholic priest, was convicted of teaching
and preaching without first taking the oath and challenged the provision on ex post
facto grounds.49
41 Id. at 388, 390.
44 Id. at 391; see also id. at 396 (opinion of Paterson, J.) ("The historic page abundantly
evinces, that the power of passing such laws should be withheld from legislators; as it is a
dangerous instrument in the hands of bold, unprincipled, aspiring, and party men, and has
been two [sic] often used to effect [sic] the most detestable purposes."); id. at 399-400
(opinion of Iredell, J.) (The temptation to such abuses of power is unfortunately too alluring
for human virtue; and, therefore, the framers of the American Constitutions have wisely
denied to the respective Legislatures... the possession of the power itself ...
41 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
46 Id. at316.41 Id. at 316-17.
4' Id. at 317. These offices included "councilman, director, or trustee, or other manager
of any corporation, public or private... professor or teacher in any educational institution,
or in any common or other school." Id. The provision also expressly barred such persons
from practicing law or acting as clergy. Id.
49 Id. at281-82.
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The Court, Justice Field writing for the majority, held that the loyalty oath
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, on the basis of several Calder categories."
According to Justice Field, the oath violated the prohibition against punishing
behaviors not punishable at the time of commission; enhanced the punishment of
other behaviors already made criminal at the time of their commission;5 2 and
subverted the "presumptions of innocence," and thus altered rules of evidence.
5 3
While faciallytargeting professional association, the oath nonetheless raised ex post
facto concern:
The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was
leveled at the thing, not the name. It intended that the rights of the
citizen should be secure against deprivation for past conduct by
legislative enactment, under any form, however disguised. If the
inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment, its insertion in
the fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding. 4
In the late 1800s, the Court addressed a series of trial-related changes in state
laws, each prompting ex post facto challenges. In Kring v. Missouri," Kring was
charged with first-degree murder, ultimately pled guilty to second-degree murder,
and later successfully appealed his sentence. 6 On remand, he was convicted of
first-degree murder and sentenced to death5" on the basis of a new law that for the
first time allowed defendants to be tried for first-degree murder after entry of any
plea to a lesser offense."8
o Id. at 332.
5' In particular, "[i]t was no offence against any law to enter or leave the State of
Missouri for the purpose of avoiding enrollment or draft in the military service of the United
States, however much the evasion of such service might be the subject of moral censure." Id.
at 327.
52 Id. at 328. Justice Field's language on this score is a bit ambiguous stating only that
"[s]ome of the acts at which the oath is directed constituted high offences at the time they
were committed, to which, upon conviction, fine and imprisonment, or other heavy penalties,
were attached." Id.
5' According to Justice Field, "[t]hey assume that the parties are guilty; they call upon the
parties to establish their innocence; and they declare that such innocence can be shown only
in one way - by an inquisition, in the form of an expurgatory oath, into the consciences of
the parties." Id. at 328.
5' Id. at 325. In the same term, the Court also invalidated, on ex post facto grounds, a
loyalty oath enacted by Congress, which served to prohibit a lawyer from practicing law
because the statute was "a means for the infliction of punishment." Exparte Garland, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866).
55 107U.S. 221 (1883).
56 Id. at 222.
57 Id.
1s Id. at 223-24.
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The Court reversed on ex post facto grounds, citing two Calder categories.59
First, the change in Missouri law amounted to a change in a rule of evidence insofar
as "what was conclusive evidence of innocence" of first-degree murder - actual
conviction of a lower grade of homicide - was nullified by the new law.' Second,
the new law retroactively altered the quantum of punishment imposed on Kring;
when initially convicted, he could not have been prosecuted for first-degree murder
(and sentenced to death).6 '
The Court hastened to add that it backed a "liberal construction" of the Ex Post
Facto Clause, one "in manifest accord with the purpose of the constitutional
convention to protect the individual rights of life and liberty against hostile
retrospective legislation." 2 To this end, the Court felt obliged to respond to the
assertion that the law was "procedur[al]" in nature and thus outside the ambit of ex
post facto coverage.63 The Court first noted that this could not be the case because
the term, as popularly defined, encompassed rules of evidence, one of the Calder
categories." Procedure, according to the majority, was simply too broad a
categorical basis to distinguish ex post facto laws. The Court asked:
Can the law with regard to bail, to indictments, to grand juries, to the
trial jury, all be changed to the disadvantage of the prisoner by state
legislation after the offence was committed, and such legislation not be
held to be ex post facto because it relates to procedure... ?
And can any substantial right which the law gave the defendant at the
time to which his guilt relates be taken away from him by expostfacto
legislation, because, in the use of a modem phrase, it is called a law of
procedure? We think it cannot.65
Quoting from a previous decision, United States v. Hall, the Court stated that any
retroactive law that "alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage" is ex post
facto.66
59 Id. at 228.
60 Kring, 107 U.S. at 228.
61 id.
62 Id. at 229.
63 Id. at 231.
64 Id. at 231-32 (quoting JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2 (3d ed.
1880), to the effect that "[t]he term 'procedure' is so broad in its signification that it is
seldom employed in our books as a term of art. It includes in its meaning whatever is
embraced by the three technical terms, Pleading, Evidence, and Practice.").
65 Id. at 232.
66 Id. at 235 (quoting United States v. Hall, 2 Wash. C.C. 366 (1809)).
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Kring marked the beginning of the uncertainty that endures to this day over the
place of ex post facto protections relative to substantive and procedural legislative
changes. Only one year after deciding Kring, the Court in Hopt v. Utah rejected an
ex post facto challenge because, in the Court's view, the retroactive legal change
was procedural in nature.6" Hopt was convicted of first-degree murder, and his
conviction was reversed on appeal."8 He was retried and again convicted of first-
degree murder with the prosecution relying on the testimony of a convict then
serving time for murder, as permitted by a recent change in state law.69 On appeal,
Hopt challenged the testimony, arguing that, on the date of the offense, Utah law
specified that felons were incompetent to testify in criminal trials.70
The Court held that application of the new law did not violate the Clause,
reasoning that laws relating to witness competency failed to come within the ambit
of the Calder categories."1 While the law broadened the permissible range of
witnesses, it did not change "the quantity or degree of proof necessary to
establish... guilt," and did not alter the requisite elements or facts necessary for
guilt. 72 The provision, Justice Harlan wrote for the Court, fell within the category
"relat[ing] to modes of procedure only, in which no one can be said to have a vested
right. .. ""
The Court's reasoning inHopt reflected a decidedly more cramped ex post facto
jurisprudence. Indeed, the distinction drawn by the Hopt Court arguably was at
odds with Calder itself, where Justice Chase included in his "instances" of ex post
facto laws the retroactive removal of the second witness requirement in treason
prosecutions and the bars against unsworn and interspousal testimony.74
In a pair of decisions decided in 1898, the Court refined its broad notion of
procedure and concluded that changes in procedural law could violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause under certain circumstances. In Thompson v. Missouri,75 Thompson
was convicted of first-degree murder by means of strychnine poisoning."6 At trial
the court admitted into evidence handwritten letters of Thompson so that they could
be compared to the allegedly forged strychnine prescription.77 When the crime
occurred such exemplars were inadmissible, but the Missouri legislature later
67 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
68 Id. at 575.
69 Id. at 587.
7 Id.
71 See id. at 589-90.
72 Id.
71 Id. at 590.
4 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389 (1798).
71 171 U.S. 380 (1898).
71 Id. at 380-81.
77 Id. at 381.
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allowed their consideration.78 Thompson challenged the admission of the letters on
ex post facto grounds. 9
The Court rejected the claim, reasoning that the legal change was procedural
in nature, but provided some important elaboration.' Again writing for the Court,
Justice Harlan concluded that Thompson failed to show that he had "any vested
right in the rule of evidence" applicable at the time of his offense, or that the new
rule "entrenched upon any of the essential rights belonging to one put on trial for
a public offence."'" A criminal defendant "is not entitled of right to be tried in the
exact mode, in all respects, that may be prescribed... at the time of the commission
of the offence ... so far as mere modes of procedure are concerned.' ' 2 After
discussing Kring and Hopt, Justice Harlan added, however, that a procedural change
could violate the Clause when it "alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage,"
insofar as it affects a "substantial right."83
In Thompson v. Utah, Thompson killed a man when applicable law guaranteed
a jury of twelve, but he was ultimately tried by ajury of eight, as permitted by a law
newly enacted when Utah was admitted to the Union." Justice Harlan, yet again
writing for the Court, concluded that the change in jury composition was of the
procedural kind condemned in Kring.81 Procedural disadvantage violated the
Clause, Justice Harlan reasoned, when it "materially impair[ed] the right of the
accused to have the question of his guilt determined according to the law as it was
when the offence was committed." 86 At the same time, however, Justice Harlan
acknowledged the difficulty of applying the materiality test:
The difficulty is not so much as to the soundness of the general rule that
an accused has no vested right in particular modes of procedure, as in
determining whether particular statutes by their operation take from an
accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he
7 Id.
'9 Id. at 382.
80 Id. at 387-88.
"' Id. at388. This was because the legal change did not "disturb the fundamental rule that
the state, as a condition of its right to take the life of an accused, must overcome the
presumption of his innocence and establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 387.
92 Id. at 386.
" Id. at 383 (quoting United States v. Hall, 2 Wash. C.C. 366, 373 (1809) and Kring v.
Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883)).
4 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
85 Id. at 351-52.
86 Id. at 351.
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enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offence charged against
him.
87
The definitional uncertainty continued in the ensuing decades, assuming new
forms. In Beazell v. Ohio, the Court rejected an ex post facto challenge to a law that
retroactively altered the ability of co-defendants to pursue separate trials."8 The
Beazell defendants were jointly indicted for embezzlement. 9 At the time of their
offense, Ohio law expressly allowed for separate trials, but by the time of trial, the
law had changed to permit separate trials only "for good cause shown." 9 After
being tried jointly and convicted, the defendants challenged the law on ex post facto
grounds.
91
The Court rejected the claim, resorting to a novel formulation of the Calder
categories. Rather than recounting the traditional four categories identified in
Calder,92 the Beazell Court articulated a tripartite framework, which at once omitted
the second and fourth Calder categories, and specified a new category -
concerning any "defense" retroactively withdrawn by law.93 According to Beazell,
an ex post facto law is one "which punishes as a crime an act previously committed,
which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for
a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any
defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed .... .
87 Id. at 352.
u8 269 U.S. 167 (1925).
" Id. at 168.
90 Id. at 169.
91 Id.
92 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
9 Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169-70. The genesis of defense as a category appears to date from
statements made by the Court inKringv. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221,229 (1882), and Thompson
v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 384 (1898). As subsequent cases make clear, to the extent the
"defense" category still enjoys recognition, it has been subsumed in Calder categories one
and two.
14 Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169. In its next sentence, the Court confusingly elaborated on its
test, making reference to the second Calder category but yet again omitting the fourth:
The constitutional prohibition and the judicial interpretation of [ex post facto]
rest upon the notion that laws, whatever their form, which purport to make
innocent acts criminal after the event, or to aggravate an offense, are harsh and
oppressive, and that the criminal quality attributable to an act, either by the legal
definition of the offense or by the nature or amount of the punishment imposed
for its commission, should not be altered by legislative enactment, after the fact,
to the disadvantage of the accused.
Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
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Applying these criteria, the Court concluded that the change in Ohio law was
a procedural one, affecting only how a defendant's trial was to be conducted." The
change did not deprive Beazell "of any defense previously available, nor affect the
criminal quality of the act charged."9 6 Nor did the change alter "the legal definition
of the offense or the punishment to be meted out."'97 The law merely "restored a
mode of trial deemed appropriate at common law, with discretionary power in the
court to direct separate trials."98 Again, however, the Court acknowledged that
some types of procedural changes triggered ex post facto concern, but noted the
difficulty of distinguishing such claims:
Just what alterations of procedure will be held to be of sufficient
moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition cannot be embraced
within a formula or stated in a general proposition. The distinction is one
of degree. But the constitutional provision was intended to secure
substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation,
and not to limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of
procedure which do not affect matters of substance."
In Dobbert v. Florida, the Court again grappled with the substance/ procedure
distinction.' At the time the defendant committed several killings, Florida law
provided that a capital defendant would be sentenced to death unless a majority of
the jury recommended life. 1' After the murders, however, the state supreme court
invalidated the law, and the Florida legislature adopted a new capital sentencing
law.'0 2 The new regime provided for a separate proceeding, in lieu of the prior
approach that consolidated the guilt-sentencing phase, and further authorized the
trial court to overrule the jury's refusal to impose a sentence of death.'0 3 Defendant
was sentenced to death under the amended law, after the jury voted ten-to-two to
impose life and the trial court overruled the recommendation.'" Contending that
the new law deprived him of a substantial right to have the jury determine whether
he was to live or die, defendant challenged the law on ex post facto grounds.'
" See Beazell, 269 U.S. at 170.
SId.
9 id.
9' Id. at 171.
9 Id. (citation omitted).
'0' 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
o' Id. at 288.
102 id.
'03 Id. at 289 n.5.
'o' Id. at 287.
105 Id.
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The Court concluded that the law was procedural in nature and rejected the
claim." The amended law "simply altered the methods employed in determining
whether the death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in the quantum
of punishment attached to the crime." 107 To the Dobbert Court, designation of a law
as procedural in nature itself was dispositive: "Even though it may work to the
disadvantage of a defendant, a procedural change is not ex post facto."'O8 Quoting
its prior language in Hopt,109 the Court stated that "[tihe crime for which the present
defendant was indicted, the punishment prescribed therefor[e], and the quantity or
degree of proof necessary to establish his guilt, all remained unaffected by the
subsequent statute."' 10
Moreover, the Court reasoned, the claim failed because the amended Florida
law did not disadvantage the defendant. This was because it "[could not] be said
with assurance" that even under the old sentencing regime the jury would have
returned a life sentence."' With its added level of review by the trial court,
allowance for the presentation of mitigating evidence in a new post-guilt phase and
assurance of appellate review, the new law provided defendant "with more, rather
than less, judicial protection.""' 2
Finally, the Dobbert Court rejected the defendant's claim that he suffered an ex
post facto violation because when the killings occurred no "valid" capital law was
in effect, given that shortly thereafter the Florida Supreme Court struck down the
state's law on the basis of Furman v. Georgia."' The majority characterized the
argument as "sophistic," "highly technical," and "mock[ing] the substance of the Ex
Post Facto Clause.""' Regardless of the constitutional invalidity of the law, its
existence in the Florida statutes "served as an 'operative fact"' l5 that provided
'06 Id. at 293.
107 Id. at 293-94.
108 Id. at 293.
i09 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
"I Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 294 (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589-90 (1884)).
.' Id. The Court elaborated in a footnote:
For example, the jury's recommendation may have been affected by the fact that
the members of the jury were not the final arbiters of life or death. They may
have chosen leniency when they knew that that decision rested ultimately on the
shoulders of the trial judge, but might not have followed the same course if their
vote were final.
Id. at 294 n.7.
112 Id. at 295.
"1 Id. at 297-98.
"1 Id. at 297.
15 Id. at 298. Notably, the Court made use of a civil case to support this proposition. See
id. at 297-98 (citing Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374
(1940)).
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sufficient warning to potential killers of the penalty Florida would seek upon a
finding of culpability."
6
The Court's 1990 decision in Collins v. Youngblood"' marked its continued
proclivity to view the Ex Post Facto Clause in narrow terms. In Collins, the
defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and to pay a fine, yet the fine
was not authorized by law."8 Under Texas law, the error entitled defendant to a
new trial, but while defendant's habeas petition was pending on appeal, the Texas
legislature passed a statute expressly allowing appellate courts to reform improper
verdicts, obviating any need for remand." 9 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
modified the verdict and reinstated the defendant's prison term, leading to an ex
post facto challenge. 20
The Collins Court rejected the claim, reaching back sixty-five years to its
decision in Beazell for support, and, yet again, modified Calder. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[t]he Beazell formulation is
faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto
Clause: Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase
the punishment for criminal acts."12' In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that
Beazell had modified Calder, in particular omitting reference to changes in
evidence as being ex post facto, but inferred that "[a]s cases subsequent to Calder
make clear, this language was not intended to prohibit the application of new
evidentiary rules in trials for crimes committed before the changes.' 22
Applying this test, the Court found no ex post facto violation, reasoning that the
new law constituted a procedural change that neither altered the definition of
defendant's crime of conviction, nor increased the punishment associated with
conviction.' Moreover, the Court proceeded to disavow its prior view that
changes in procedural law implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause when they affect
1' See id. at 297 ("Whether or not the old statute would, in the future, withstand
constitutional attack, it clearly indicated Florida's view of the severity of murder and of the
degree of punishment which the legislature wished to impose upon murderers.").
"t 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
"' Id. at 39.
"19 Id. at 39-40.
120 Id. at 40.
121 Id. at 43.
'22 Id. at43 n.3 (citing Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 386-87 (1898) and Hopt v.
Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 588-90 (1884)).
121 Id. at 44. To confuse matters all the more, the Court concluded its opinion by invoking
the Beazell tripartite framework, concluding that the Texas law "does not punish as a crime
an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; nor make more burdensome
the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor deprive one charged with crime of any
defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed." Id. at 52.
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"substantial" rights or "matters of substance."' 24  The decades-long effort to
distinguish such laws, the Court stated, had "imported confusion" into ex post facto
jurisprudence leading to an "undefined enlargement" of the reach of the Clause.'25
Rather than assigning significance to whether a law is procedural, the key issue is
whether the challenged law comes within the Calder categories, as newly
characterized by the Court.'26 Concluding that its prior decisions in Kring v.
Missouri'2 and Thompson v. Utah,128 with their focus on "substantial protections"
and "personal rights,"'29 strayed from this "analytical framework" and "caused
confusion,"' 30 the Court overruled the decisions.''
Later in the 1990s, the Court rendered several important decisions concerning
the original third Calder category, proscribing retroactive laws increasing the
quantum of punishment. 32 In prior decisions, the Court addressed laws altering
methods of punishment,' and those that functioned to increase sentence lengths.' 34
,24 Id. at 45.
'2' Id. at 45-46.
'2' Id. at 46.
127 107 U.S. 221 (1883).
'2' 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
129 Collins, 497 U.S. at 45.
' Id. at 47.
,31 Id. at 50-52. While embracing its truncated version of the Calder categories, drawn
from Beazell, and overruling Kring and Thompson, the Collins majority seemed untroubled
by language inBeazell suggesting abroaderview. See Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171 (asserting that
the Ex Post Facto Clause "was intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary
and oppressive legislation").
131 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (proscribing "[e]very law that
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime,
when committed").
"' See Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 185 (1915) (finding no increase in
punishment when death penalty statute was amended to require death by electrocution rather
than by hanging); Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 326 (1905) (finding no increase
in punishment when capital prisoners were subject to six-to-nine months in "close
confinement" before execution, when original law required confinement in county jail for
three to six months). But see In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 171 (1890) (invalidating law
mandating solitary confinement for inmates awaiting execution because law imposed
"additional punishment of the most important and painful character").
'" See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,435-36 (1987) (invalidating increase in prison
term based on retroactive application of sentencing guidelines); Lindsey v. Washington, 301
U.S. 397, 401-02 (1937) (invalidating law that mandated a fifteen-year prison term, in lieu
of prior law providing for a fifteen-year maximum, and made parole revocable at will). In
Lindsey, the Court held that it was irrelevant for ex post facto purposes that the sentence
actually received by petitioners was allowable under both the new and old laws:
It is true that petitioners might have been sentenced to fifteen years under the old
statute. But the ex post facto clause looks to the standard of punishment
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In the 1990s, the Court rendered several important decisions regarding retroactive
modifications to the ability of prisoners to win early release, in particular.
In California Department of Corrections v. Morales, ' a new law modified the
intervals at which certain prisoners could be considered for parole release - from
an annual basis to up to three years.' 36 Morales claimed that the retroactive change
in required frequency of opportunities for parole violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause. 37 The Court disagreed, contrasting the legal change to those in prior
successful claims, where the challenged law had the "effect of enhancing the range
of available prison terms.' 13' The new law merely "'alter[ed] the method to be
followed' in fixing a parole release date under identical substantive standards."' 39
Moreover, the decreased number of required parole hearings created "only the most
speculative and attenuated possibility ... of increasing the measure of punishment
for covered crimes, and such conjectural effects" did not warrant ex post facto
protection."4 For the Clause to apply, the petitioner must show "a sufficient risk
of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.''
Extending ex post facto coverage to laws having only conceivable effects on
prescribed by a statute, rather than to the sentence actually imposed. The
Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime
already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the
wrongdoer. It is for this reason that an increase in the possible penalty is expost
facto, regardless of the length of the sentence actually imposed, since the
measure of punishment prescribed by the later statute is more severe than that of
the earlier.
Removal of the possibility of a sentence of less than fifteen years, at the end of
which petitioners would be freed from further confinement and the tutelage of
a parole revocable at will, operates to their detriment in the sense that the
standard of punishment adopted by the new statute is more onerous than that of
the old .... [Moreover,] [i]t is plainly to the substantial disadvantage of
petitioners to be deprived of all opportunity to receive a sentence which would
give them freedom from custody and control prior to the expiration of the 15-
year term.
Lindsey, 301 U.S. at 401-02 (citations omitted).
135 514 U.S. 499 (1995).
136 Id. at 503.
137 Id. at 504.
138 Id. at 507.
I d. at 508 (quoting Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,433 (1987)).
140 Id. at 509. In a footnote, citing Collins, the Court expressly disavowed the contention
that changes in punishment are ex post facto if they produce "some ambiguous sort of
'disadvantage."' Id. at 506 n.3.
141 Id. at 509. The majority added that the Ex Post Facto Clause "does [not] require that
the sentence be carried out under the identical legal regime that previously prevailed." Id. at
510 n.6.
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punishment would, in the Court's words, require the judiciary to be charged "with
the micromanagement of an endless array of legislative adjustments of parole and
sentencing procedures.' 42
Two years later, in Lynce v. Mathis,'43 the Court addressed a Florida law
permitting the retroactive cancellation of early release credits earned by prisoners,
which were awarded when the volume of prisoners in the corrections system
exceeded predetermined levels.'" Lynce benefited from the credits and was
released, only to be rearrested when a new law rescinded the prior largesse for
certain classes of inmates (including Lynce).'" In addressing Lynce's ensuing ex
post facto challenge, the Court looked to the "objective" effects of the legal change
- whether the retroactive cancellation of sentence credit served to lengthen his
period of incarceration.'" The Court had no difficulty finding the test satisfied,
given that Lynce was rearrested after having been released. 47 Unlike the mere lost
"opportunity" and "merely speculative" lengthening of imprisonment contested in
Morales, Lynce experienced greater punishment and, therefore, had a meritorious
claim.'"
Finally, in 2000 and 2003, the Court returned to the foundational work of
discerning the reach of the Ex Post Facto Clause, first delineated by Justice Chase
over two centuries earlier in Calder.'4 In Carmell v. Texas,'50 the Court was
presented with the question of whether a retroactive change in the rules of evidence
warranted ex post facto protection.'' When Carmell sexually abused his fifteen-
242 Id. at 508.
143 519 U.S. 433 (1997).
'4 Id. at 435.
145 Id. at 436.
146 Id. at 443.
14 Id. at 447. According to the Court, "retroactive alteration of parole or early release
provisions, like the retroactive application of provisions that govern initial sentencing,
implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause because such credits are 'one determinant of petitioner's
prison term... and... [the petitioner's] effective sentence is altered once this determinant
is changed."' Id. at 445 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 32 (1981)).
'1" Id. at 446 n.16, 447. In 2000, the Court refined the Morales analytic framework. See
Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250-52 (2000). In Garner, which also involved a retroactive
decrease in the frequency of parole reconsideration hearings of inmates, instead of restating
the Morales standard of requisite "sufficient risk of increasing" punishment, Morales, 514
U.S. at 509, the Court required that the new law "in its operation, create[] a significant risk
of increased punishment." Id. at 257. Denying Gamer's claim under this test, the Court
emphasized that "[tjhe States must have due flexibility in formulating parole procedures and
addressing problems associated with confinement and release." Id. at 252.
"' Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
Is0 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
I' Id. at 516.
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year-old stepdaughter, Texas law specified that a person could not be convicted on
the basis of uncorroborated testimony of a victim if the victim was fourteen years
of age or older at the time of the offense.' Later, Texas amended its law to allow
conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of a victim, so long as the victim
was less than eighteen at the time of the offense.' The trial court employed the
new law, allowing the step-daughter to testify without corroboration." Carmell
was convicted and challenged the retroactive application of the new law on ex post
facto grounds.'"
The Court concluded that the amended law violated the fourth Calder category
prohibiting changes in rules of evidence "in order to convict the offender."' 56
Writing for a majority ofhighly unusual liberal/conservative membership, 57 Justice
Stevens stated that the new law "changed the quantum of evidence necessary to
sustain a conviction; under the new law, petitioner could be (and was) convicted on
the victim's testimony alone, without any corroborating evidence."5 s Relying on
Calder, Justice Stevens reasoned that "[r]equiring only the victim's testimony to
convict, rather than the victim's testimony plus other corroborating evidence is
surely 'less testimony required to convict' in any straightforward sense of those
words.' 59
To reach this outcome, Justice Stevens needed to rehabilitate the fourth Calder
category, the vitality of which was cast into doubt by language in Beazell and
Collins, which, while professing fealty to Calder, substantially altered Calder's
categories by inter alia excluding the fourth category (relating to evidence).' 6
152 Id. at 517. The statute provided for two exceptions, neither of which was satisfied
under the facts:
A conviction.., is supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim
of the sexual offense if the victim informed any person, other than the defendant,
of the alleged offense within six months after the date on which the offense is
alleged to have occurred. The requirement that the victim inform another person
of an alleged offense does not apply if the victim was younger than 14 years of
age at the time of the alleged offense.
Id. at 517 (quoting TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.07 (Vernon 1983)).
113 Id. at 518.
'14 Id. at 516-17.
'"s Id. at 518-19.
156 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (prohibiting "[e]very law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at
the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender").
15 Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, Souter, and Breyer comprisedthe majority. Carmell,
529 U.S. at 515.
151 Id. at 530.
s9 Id. (citing Calder, 3 U.S. at 390).
160 See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text
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Noting the inconsistency in Collins between its insistence that the Calder categories
provide "the 'exclusive definition' of ex post facto laws," and its questionable
assertion that Beazell's definition was a "faithful" interpretation of the "original
understanding" of the Ex Post Facto Clause,161 Justice Stevens reaffirmed the
existence of the fourth category. If Collins had intended to discard the fourth
category (itself not implicated under the Collins facts), Justice Stevens concluded,
it would not "have done so in a footnote. ... [T]his Court does not discard
longstanding precedent in this manner. 1 62 Thus, "Collins held that it was a mistake
to stray beyond Calder's four categories, not that the fourth category was itself
mistaken."'6
To provide added support, Justice Stevens surveyed the historical record
leading up to Calder, including the 1695 case of Sir John Fenwick, cited by Justice
Chase, to exemplify the fourth category.64 Justice Stevens noted that the fourth
category "resonates harmoniously with one of the principal interests that the Ex
Post Facto Clause was designed to serve, fundamental justice.' 65 Observing that
the Ex Post Facto Clause is also directed at ensuring that laws afford "'fair warning
of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly
changed,' and at reinforcing the separation of powers,"' 6 Justice Stevens
emphasized that the absence of a reliance interest, such as in Fenwick's case, 67 did
not compel any modification in the Calder categories. 68  Rather, the fourth
161 Carmell, 529 U.S. at 538.
162 Id. "The better understanding of Collins," Justice Stevens inferred, was "that it
eliminated a doctrinal hitch" embodied in cases it overruled - Kring and Thompson -
"which purported to define the scope of the Clause along an axis distinguishing between laws
involving 'substantial protections' and those that are merely 'procedural."' Id. at 539.
163 Id.
'" Fenwick was a Jacobin thought to have conspired with others to overthrow King
William III. At the time of the alleged betrayal, English law required two witnesses to
support any high treason conviction, which served to bar Fenwick's prosecution. Id. at 526.
Fenwick, however, was ultimately tried under a new law that eschewed the two-witness
requirement, and was convicted and beheaded. Id. at 528-30.
165 Id. at 531.
166 Id. at 531 n.21 (quoting Millerv. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,430 (1987), and citing Weaver
v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n.10 (1981)).
67 See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 (2000) ("Fenwick could claim no credible
reliance interest in the two-witness statute, as he could not possibly have known that only two
of his fellow conspirators would be able to testify as to his guilt, nor that he would be
successful in bribing one of them to leave the country.").
168 See id. at 531 n.21:
[Notice and reliance] are not [the Clause's] only aims, and the absence of a
reliance interest is not an argument in favor of abandoning the [fourth] category
itself. If it were, the same conclusion would follow for Calder's third category
(increases in punishment), as there are few, if any, reliance interests in planning
future criminal activities based on the expectation of less severe repercussions.
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category - and Fenwick's case - comported "precisely" with the Framers' core
concern over oppressive and arbitrary behavior by government: "There is plainly
a fundamental fairness interest, even apart from any claim of reliance or notice, in
having the government abide by the rules of law it establishes to govern the
circumstances under which it can deprive a person of his or her liberty or life."' 69
The Ex Post Facto Clause, in short, prohibits the government from refusing, "after
the fact, to play by its own rules, altering them in a way that is advantageous only
to the State, to facilitate an easier conviction."'7 ° It thus guards against the
subversion of"fundamentaljustice" and the promulgation of "manifestly unjust and
oppressive" laws.' 7'
Viewed in this context, Justice Stevens concluded that the change in Texas law
bore a striking similarity to the evidentiary change condemned in Fenwick's case,
raising ex post facto concern.7 2 Moreover, unlike Hopt v. Utah' and Thompson
v. Missouri,'74 the Texas law did not merely concern "witness competency" - it did
not "simply enlarge the class of persons who may be competent to testify" or
"remove existing restrictions" on the competency of potential witnesses.'75 Rather,
the law concerned the sufficiency of the evidence necessary for the State to meet
its burden of proof.' Hopt, in particular, "expressly distinguished witness
69 Id. at 532-33. According to Justice Stevens, "the pertinent rule altered in Fenwick's
case went directly to the general issue of guilt, lowering the minimum quantum of evidence
required to obtain a conviction. The Framers, quite clearly, viewed such maneuvers as
grossly unfair, and adopted the Ex Post Facto Clause accordingly." Id. at 534.
"0 Id. at 533. The Court hastened to add that not all changes in evidentiary law implicate
the Ex Post Facto Clause:
Ordinary rules of evidence, for example, do not violate the Clause. Rules of that
nature are ordinarily evenhanded, in the sense that they may benefit either the
State or the defendant in any given case. More crucially, such rules, by simply
permitting evidence to be admitted at trial, do not at all subvert the presumption
of innocence, because they do not concern whether the admissible evidence is
sufficient to overcome the presumption.
Id. at 533 n.23 (citation omitted).
171 Id. at 531-32. The Court elaborated in a footnote, however, that "the principle of
unfairness ... is not a doctrine unto itself, invalidating laws under the Ex Post Facto Clause
by its own force." Id. at 533 n.23.
172 Id. at 530.
173 110 U.S. 574 (1884). For discussion of Hopt, see supra notes 67-74 and
accompanying text.
'74 171 U.S. 380 (1898). For discussion of Thompson, see supra notes 75-83 and
accompanying text.
171 Carmell, 529 U.S. at 544 (quoting Hopt, 110 U.S. at 589-90).
176 Id. at 545. According to the Court:
Under the law in effect at the time the acts were committed, the prosecution's
case was legally insufficient... unless the state could produce both the victim's
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competency laws from those laws that 'alter the degree, or lessen the amount or
measure, of the proof which was made necessary to conviction when the crime was
committed.""" Justice Stevens elaborated on the distinction he saw between the
two types of rules, again emphasizing the Clause's core concem over unfairness:
[A] sufficiency of the evidence rule resonates with the interests to which
the Ex Post Facto Clause is addressed in a way that a witness
competency rule does not. In particular, the elements of unfairness and
injustice in subverting the presumption of innocence are directly
implicated by rules lowering the quantum of evidence required to
convict. Such rules will always run in the prosecution's favor, because
they always make it easier to convict the accused. This is so even if the
accused is not in fact guilty, because the coercive pressure of a more
easily obtained conviction may induce a defendant to plead to a lesser
crime rather than run the risk of conviction on a greater crime. Witness
competency rules, to the contrary, do not necessarily run in the State's
favor....
Nor do such rules necessarily affect, let alone subvert, the presumption
of innocence. The issue of the admissibility of evidence is simply
different from the question whether the properly admitted evidence is
sufficient to convict the defendant. Evidence admissibility rules do not
go to the general issue of guilt, nor to whether a conviction, as a matter
of law, may be sustained.'"
testimony and corroborative evidence. The amended law, however, changed the
quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a conviction; under the new law,
petitioner could be (and was) convicted on the victim's testimony alone, without
any corroborating evidence.
Id. at 530.
177 Id. at 545 (quoting Hopt, 110 U.S. at 589).
178 Id. at 546. The decision inspired high praise from Professor Laurence Tribe. He stated:
Carmell is a rather well argued and closely reasoned case that makes one feel
proud of the Court. That is, every now and then it looks like these people are not
simply there to act on the basis of their impulses in determining whether it's
better to get tough on criminals or better to vindicate some abstract ideal of
liberty or of fairness.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Law Enforcement and Criminal Law Decisions, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 517,
538 (2001) (quoting Professor Tribe's response to Professor Chemerinsky's remarks).
Professor Amar welcomed the decision with less relish. See Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and
Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 601, 613-14 (2001) (stating that Carmell
"defined the Ex Post Facto Clause very broadly, and then applied it quite rigidly," and that
the case "exemplifies modem doctrinalism and illustrates some of its pathologies").
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Most recently, in Stogner v. California,'79 the Court addressed a claim brought
pursuant to the second Calder category, a category never before interpreted by the
Court, proscribing "[e]very law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was when committed,"'80 also seemingly abandoned by the Court in Beazell and
Collins. '' In 1998, Stogner was indicted for sexually abusing his children between
1955 and 1973."82 Until 1993, California law contained a three-year statute of
limitations, which by 1998 had long since expired with respect to Stogner's alleged
wrongdoing. 8' The 1993 amendment allowed such time-barred prosecutions to be
brought, so long as they commenced within a year of the victim's first complaint to
the police." 4 The question before the Court was whether the Clause was violated
by California's effort to revive previously time-barred prosecutions.'
The Court, with Justice Breyer writing for the majority, concluded that the
amendment ran afoul of Calder's second category, offering three rationales." 6
First, by retroactively permitting prosecutions otherwise not permitted by law:
[The new law in basic terms] threaten[ed] the kind of harm that ... the
Ex Post Facto Clause seeks to avoid. Long ago the Court pointed out
that the Clause protects liberty by preventing governments from enacting
statutes with "manifestly unjust and oppressive" retroactive effects.
Judge Learned Hand later wrote that extending a limitation period after
the State has assured "a man that he has become safe from its
pursuit... seems to most of us unfair and dishonest.'
In such a situation, as in Carmell, "the government has refused 'to play by its
own rules.""88 Also, inasmuch as the limitations period served as an amnesty, the
new law deprived Stogner of "fair warning" because he might have otherwise
sought to preserve exculpatory evidence. 9 If legislatures were permitted "to pick
'7 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003).
180 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
181 See supra notes 88-99, 117-31 and accompanying text (discussing Beazell and
Collins).
182 Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2449.
183 id.
184 Id. (citing 1993 Cal. Stat. ch. 390, § 1 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE §
803(g) (West Supp. 2003)).
185 id.
186 id.
'.. Id. (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DaUll.) 386, 391 (1798), and Falter v. United
States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928)).
188 Id. (quoting Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 (2000)).
19 Id. (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)).
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and choose when to act retroactively," there would be a risk of both "'arbitrary and
potentially vindictive legislation,' and erosion of the separation of powers."'
90
Second, Justice Breyer reasoned that the California law fell squarely within the
second Calder category.' 9' To reach this result, Justice Breyer invoked what he
called Justice Chase's "alternative description" of ex post facto laws, set forth
elsewhere in Chase's opinion in Calder: "[Alt other times they inflicted
punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment."''
Focusing on this language in tandem with the traditional language of the second
category, Justice Breyer concluded that California's new statute of limitations
"aggravated" Stogner's alleged crime because at the time of the amendment Stogner
was not "liable to any punishment."' 93 This understanding of the second category,
in turn, clarified its distinctive place in the Calder framework:
So to understand the second category (as applying where a new law
inflicts a punishment upon a person not then subject to that punishment,
to any degree) explains why and how that category differs from both the
first category (making criminal noncriminal behavior) and the third
category (aggravating the punishment). 94
Finally, Justice Breyer attached importance to the "well settled" view that the
Clause bars laws permitting revival of time-barred prosecutions, citing to
Congress's rejection of such laws as applied to Confederates in the Reconstruction
Era, as well as the condemnation of the laws by courts and commentators down the
years. '
95
'9' Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2449 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 & n.10).
191 See id.
'9' Id. at 2450 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 389).
'9' Id. at 2451; see also id. at 2450-51 (concluding that the law fell within the second
category "as long as those words are understood as Justice Chase understood them - i.e.,
as referring to a statute that 'inflict[s] punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable
to any punishment').
'9' Id. at 2451. Justice Breyer also emphasized that, while the California law fell "within
the literal terms" of the second category, it possibly implicated the fourth category as well,
insofar as it diminished "the quantum of evidence required to convict." Id. at 2452 (quoting
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 532 (2000)). This was because "a statute of limitations
reflects a legislative judgment that, after a certain time, no quantum of evidence is sufficient
to convict." Id. Allowing resurrection of a prosecution would "permit conviction on a
quantum of evidence where that quantum, at the time the new law is enacted, would have
been legally insufficient." Id.
"I Id. at 2446, 2452-55.
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Justice Breyer concluded by taking on the assertion by the dissent (authored by
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and
Thomas) that it was not "unfair, in any constitutionally relevant sense," for
California "to prosecute a man for crimes committed 25 to 42 years earlier when
nearly a generation has passed since the law granted him an effective amnesty."' 96
The dissent questioned "whether it is warranted to presume that criminals keep
calendars,"'97 and asserted that "it is the victim's lasting hurt, not the perpetrator's
fictional reliance, that the law should count the higher."'98 To the majority,
however, the law was constitutionally unfair because it violated "significant
reliance interests" and ignored "a predominating constitutional interest" in
governmental fairness, which outweighed the competing governmental interest in
prosecuting a decades-old allegation of child sexual abuse.'99
As the foregoing survey suggests, the Court has charted an uncertain course
with respect to its interpretation and application of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Much
of the uncertainty stems from the seminal case of Calder v. Bull itself, a 1798
decision specifying the types of retroactive laws that violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause. 200 Despite the fact that over the years the Court has, with regularity, insisted
that the categories are sacrosanct, 0 the contours of their protection have been
disputed, resulting in alternate expansion and constriction of the coverage of the Ex
Post Facto Clause. Indeed, over two hundred years after Calder, the Court in
Carmell was obliged to resuscitate the proscription against retroactive laws altering
rules of evidence, despite its unmistakable presence as the fourth Calder
category.0 2 Similarly, only in 2003 in Stogner did the Court acknowledge the
viability of the second Calder category, which previously had been thought by some
196 Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2455.
'9' Id. at 2470 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
'9' Id. at 2471 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy elaborated:
The victims whose cause is now before the Court have at last overcome shame
and the desire to repress these painful memories. They have reported the crimes
so that the violators are brought to justice and harm to others is prevented. The
Court now tells the victims that their decision to come forward is in vain.
Id.
'9' Id. at 2460-6 1.
200 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (stating that the prohibition
"necessarily requires some explanation; for, naked and without explanation, it is
unintelligible, and means nothing").
201 See, e.g., Carmellv. Texas, 529 U.S. 513,538-39 (2000); Collins v. Youngblood, 497
U.S. 37,46 (1990); Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,429 (1987); see also Exparte Garland,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 391 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting) ("[Calder's] exposition of the
nature of ex post facto laws has never been denied ...
202 See supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
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redundant of the third,"3 and otherwise ignored by the Court."' In sum, insofar as
the Calder categories are intended to function, in Richard Fallon's words, as a
vehicle to "implement the Constitution" 5 and, in particular, as a provision
avowedly designed to ensure governmental certainty and fairness, their erratic
application has been disappointing to say the least. 6
Nevertheless, at this point a few certainties can be stated. As a threshold
matter, the Ex Post Facto Clause is intended to reach only legislative enactments.0 7
Second, only criminal laws come within its ambit25 - a domain where, as one
eighteenth-century legal scholar observed, "justice wears her sternest aspect." 209
And third, the Ex Post Facto Clause solely concerns laws that are retrospective in
their application, those applying "to conduct completed before [their] enactment," 2 0
and such laws must "disadvantage" offenders coming within their scope.11
H. THE DATA
In order to assess the place of the Ex Post Facto Clause in contemporary
constitutional litigation, the author conducted a Westlaw search of all state court
decisions (including those in the District of Columbia), rendered between 1992 and
2002, involving challenges brought pursuant to the Ex Post Facto Clause. 212 State
20' See Neil Coleman McCabe & Cynthia Ann Bell, Ex Post Facto Provisions of State
Constitutions, 4 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 133, 134 (1991) (stating that the Calder
categories "have not stood the test of time. On closer analysis, the second and third categories
appear to be the same idea expressed in different ways"); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 97 n.3 (2d ed. 1986) (offering the same conclusion that
the second and third Calder categories are duplicative).
204 See supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
205 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARv. L. REV.
56, 57 (1997) (stating that "[i]dentifying the 'meaning' of the Constitution is not the Court's
only function. A crucial mission of the Court is to implement the Constitution successfully").
For more on Professor Fallon's views in this regard, see RUCHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CoNsTrrUTION (200 1).
206 The uncertainties bred by the Calder categories, and the associated concerns raised,
are discussed at infra notes 395-434 and accompanying text.
207 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977).
'08 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-93 (1798).
209 2 RICHARD WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 641
(1792).
210 Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 699 (2000).
211 Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981).
211 In addition to the federal Ex Post Facto Clause, reposed in Article I, Section 10, clause
I of the Constitution, which by its terms applies to and governs the states, the constitutions
of all but four states (Delaware, Hawaii, New York and Vermont) contain indigenous ex post
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courts, not their federal counterparts, were selected as the focus of analysis because
the states are the primary engine of criminal law legislation,"' allowing for a richer
understanding of the role of the Ex Post Facto Clause in regulating criminal justice-
related changes during the study period. Querying the "ALLSTATES" database,
the search netted a total of 1,026 claims," 4 including published and unpublished
work of the state courts. 5
facto provisions. See generally McCabe & Bell, supra note 203. Typically, the text of state
provisions tracks that of the federal provision, and state appellate courts, as with other
aspects of constitutional interpretation, practice "lockstep interpretation." See id. at 144-51;
see also G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTREDAMEL. REv.
1097, 1114-17 (1997) (summarizing research noting limited state court reliance on state
constitutions). On occasion, however, state courts expressly give a broader reading to their
facially identical, indigenous ex post facto provisions, as of course is permitted. Moreover,
at times, the language of state provisions also bars "retroactive" and "retrospective" laws,
even of a noncriminal nature. Both varieties of decisions were excluded from the database.
213 See Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 775 (JoshuaDressler ed., 2d ed. 2002) (noting that "[gleneral police powers and the
bulk of criminal jurisdiction were not granted to the federal government, and accordingly
were uniformly recognized to be reserved to the states").
214 The initial search query produced 1,647 cases, based on a Westlaw key number search
for "Retrospective and Ex Post Facto Laws" (Westlaw key number 92VII1. The author
excluded several categories of decisions from the database. These included the following: (i)
decisions based on Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), which while also
involving challenges to retroactive imposition of criminal sanctions, sound in due process
because they concern judicial rulings (not legislative enactments); (ii) decisions interpreting
indigenous state ex post facto provisions, as noted in supra note 212; (iii) decisions not
expressly predicated on the Ex Post Facto Clause but challenging laws with retroactive
application; (iv) decisions redundant of one another because they were affirmed or reversed
by other cases in the database; (v) decisions addressing laws that were not intended to be
applied retroactively; (vi) decisions resolved on procedural grounds (e.g., mootness or
waiver); and (vii) decisions of a miscellaneous nature not implicating the Ex Post Facto
Clause (e.g., styled as an ex post facto claim but decided on vagueness grounds).
In the rare event that a single decision contained more than one ex post facto challenge,
each challenge was counted. Three decisions fell in this category, each involving two distinct
ex post facto claims. Also, on three occasions, federal courts granted habeas relief when state
courts did not; the federal results, not those of the states, were counted.
21s This was done in order to obtain the broadest possible understanding of the ex post
facto claims filed and the rationales used by courts to resolve them. For general commentary
on the propriety of judicial resort to unpublished decisions, and the resulting consequences
to the case law, see, for example, Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against
Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 755 (2003); Johanna S. Schiavoni, Comment,
Who 's Afraid of Precedent?: The Debate Over the Precedential Value of Unpublished
Opinions, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1859 (2002).
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A. Types of Claims Brought
Table 1 reflects the number of ex post facto claims resolved by state courts
during the study period, arrayed by categories in descending order of frequency.
The Table reflects the broad gamut of crime-related legislative activity during the
study period, a time when crime control and draconian criminal law measures
enjoyed high political salience." 6 The largest category encompasses challenges to
laws making more onerous the sentences of convicted offenders, a highly popular
legislative pastime. 17  In this category, laws targeting recidivist offenders
predominate, a penal strategy with widespread appeal in the early-to-mid 1990s,
most vividly evidenced in California with the 1994 enactment of its "three strikes"
law." 8 Most often the claims involved enhancements of generalized application,
including expanded consideration of prior juvenile adjudications, although with
some regularity particular offender groups such as drunk drivers were singled out
for enhanced punishment. The category also contains a significant number of
claims challenging retroactive increases in "cleansing" or "look back" periods, the
temporal windows used by sentencing courts to assess offending history for
216 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
217 To politicians, there is much to gain and little to lose in enacting such laws. As Justice
Stevens observed, "[t]here is obviously little legislative hay to be made in cultivating the
multiple murderer vote." Cal. Dep't ofCorr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499,522 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In more practical terms, as Harold Krent has written, "[l]egislators need not
fear that enacting most criminal measures will dry up campaign coffers. Throughout history,
criminal offenders have been from the poorest strata in society .... Nor will legislators
necessarily lose votes if they are insensitive to the needs of convicted felons. Felons often
cannot vote.... ." Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil
Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2168-69 (1996). For more on the reasons for
this legislative unconcern, see Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and
the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of
the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993).
218 See Ronald F. Wright, Three Strikes Legislation and Sentencing Commission
Objectives, 20 LAW & POL'Y 429,430 (1998) (surveying legislative efforts nationwide in the
mid-1990s to enact "three strikes laws"). As Professor Wright observes, recidivist-oriented
enhancements are far from new, existing in one form or another in the U.S. since the 1790s.
Id. at 441. The new laws enacted in the mid- 1990s were distinctive because they carried
much longer enhancements (including life without parole, as in California); imposed more
limits on courts to deviate from their imposition; and expanded the list of predicate
convictions sufficient to trigger enhancement (to include nonviolent felonies). Id. at 442. For
discussion of the motivating forces behind the 1990s-genre laws and the controversies
surrounding them, see generally Gary LaFree, Too Much Democracy or Too Much Crime?
Lessons From California's Three-Strikes Law, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 875 (2002), and
Robert Heglin, A Flurry ofRecidivist Legislation Means: "Three Strikes and You're Out",
20 J. LEGIs. 213 (1994).
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TABLE 1: Types of Claims by Category (n=1026)
Sentence Enhancement 232 Monetary Sanctions 61
Recidivist 143 Fine/Reimbursement 23
First-offense 89 Restitution 24
Custody Modification 219 Fee 14
Parole 197 Judicial Administration 55
Probation 7 Evidence* 47
Probation/Parole Violation 15 Death Penalty** 45
Post-Custody Sanction 168 Jury/Trial Rights 30
Registration/Notification 91 Institutional Administration 28
Sex Offender Commitment 39 Juvenile Justice*** 17
Collateral Consequences 26 Miscellaneous 8
Expungement Refusal 12
Substantive Criminal Law 116
Crime 62
Statute of Limitations 26
Felon-in-possession 23
Defense 5
* This category includes claims challenging the use of "victim impact evidence" in
capital trials but excludes challenges to evidentiary laws that permit consideration
of prior convictions at sentencing for enhancement purposes (categorized as
sentence enhancements).
** This category includes claims that would also logically merit placement in other
categories (eg., use of prior juvenile adjudications as a punishment phase
aggravator in capital cases; prior killing by defendant as an aggravator).
*** This category excludes claims that, while concerning juvenile offenders, touch
on legal changes of a more particular nature (e.g., laws making changes to the
consideration of prior juvenile adjudications for punishment decisions, categorized
as recidivist sentence enhancements; laws requiring juveniles to register as sex
offenders, categorized as registration/ notification).
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purposes of recidivism. The other subcategory, constituting thirty-eight percent
of claims in the larger category, challenged laws affecting first-time offenders.
Here, statutory increases to maximum or minimum sentences and changes to
sentencing guidelines were the primary subjects of challenge. Challenges to new
laws requiring that specimens be provided for assessment of DNA and HIV are
also categorized here.
The next largest category of claims involves changes to probation and parole
eligibility and supervision. Faced with the negative political consequences of
prisoners being freed before their terms ended, in the 1990s state legislatures
moved to restrict the availability of early release, and their laws attracted the
Court's attention in Morales (1995) and Lynce (1997). The database reflects this
activity, containing a broad array of challenges, including laws affecting changes
to "good time," "gain time," or early release credits; requiring that some
significant portion of a sentence be served before the individual becomes eligible
for parole (often 85%); requiring or extending periods of supervised release; and
modifying the intervals at which parole review is to occur.
The third largest category of claims involves a variety of sanctions that, while
not involving direct penal servitude as such, nonetheless differentially burden
those convicted of crimes, doing so after they have served their time. This
category contains four subcategories of post-custody sanctions enjoying
significant popularity in the 1990s.2 " The subcategory containing the largest
number of claims relates to sex offender registration and community notification
laws, popularly known as "Megan's Laws" as a result of the 1994 New Jersey law
enacted after the sexual assault and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka22
This subcategory also contains a small number of claims challenging required
post-custody registration on the basis of gang affiliation, felon status, and drug
conviction. The second subcategory relates to provisions, also directed at sex
offenders, known as "sexually violent predator laws," designed to subject
offenders to involuntary civil commitment after their release from prison.2 ' The
219 See generally David G. Savage, Do More Than Time for Crime, A.B.A. J., May 2003,
at 28 (describing recent initiatives).
m See generally Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural
Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINoLOGY 1167, 1172-73 (1999) (discussing genesis of New Jersey law and rapid
national proliferation of laws after 1994).
"I See generally Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the
Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CoNN. L. REV. 319, 320-21
(2003). Although originating in the 1930s, the laws experienced an extended desuetude until
Washington State adopted a new approach in 1990, which, in contrast to former laws, uses
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third subcategory of sanctions is especially broad, encompassing other burdens
collaterally related to criminal conviction.222 Claims here include post-conviction
deprivations of licenses (for example, to practice law or drive a car); forfeitures
of property; limitations on receiving state-authorized funds while incarcerated;
and prohibitions on holding public office. Lastly, the category contains
challenges to laws retroactively limiting the capacity of individuals to have prior
criminal convictions expunged from their records, tangible evidence of the
increasingly unforgiving tendencies of government.223
The fourth largest category concerns arguably the most basic, political aspect
of the legislative process: the devise and modification of the substantive criminal
law. Substantive criminal lawmaking, of course, emanates from the basic
Lockean obligation to ensure maintenance of the social and political order,224 with
the state assuming the role of aggrieved party.225 However, as recognized by
Jerome Hall over sixty years ago, the criminal law inevitably also reflects the
corresponding political order of its era of origin.226 The decisions surveyed here
appear to confirm this view, addressing challenges to a variety of new laws
bespeaking contemporary American concerns, including identity theft, "pattern"
commitment in addition to, rather than in lieu of, prison terms. For more on this evolution
see Eric S. Janus, Sexual Predators, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1475-76
(Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002).
222 SeegenerallyA.BA. CRIMINALJUSTICESTANDARDSON COLLATERALCONSEQUENCES
AND DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (draft 3d ed. 2002); Kathleen M. Olivares
et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study ofState Legal
Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 10 (1996).
223 George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Use
of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1907 (1999) (discussing the tendency in late modem
penality for unforgiveness).
224 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. 3, para. 13 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., MacMillan Pub. Co. 1952) (1698) (positing that civil government is needed "to
restrain the partiality and violence of men"); see also CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRrrOFTHELAWS, bk. HI (Prometheus Books 2002) (1748) (speaking
of laws as "necessary relations").
225 LOCKE, supra note 224, at ch. 2, para. 8 & ch. 3, para. 16; see also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY
& JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 114 (rev. ed. 1990) (observing that "[t]he state
is the complaining party in a criminal action and in a sense views itself as the injured
party...").
2"6 Jerome Hall, The Substantive Law of Crimes, 1887-1936,50 HARV. L. REV. 616,616
(1937) (observing that criminal law's "evolution... has been in response to deep-seated
economic and social wants"). For a recent effort to reinvigorate the once predominant
scholarly focus on the link between political governance and criminal law making, with
special attention paid to the place of criminal law defenses in reflecting majoritarian norms,
see V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1691
(2003).
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child abuse, membership in a street gang, and stalking. During the period,
legislatures also modified the elements and definitions of already existing crimes
and burdens of proof. With defenses, the survey unearthed challenges to
retroactive changes to the defense of insanity and entrapment, in particular. The
statute of limitations subcategory relates to laws broadening limitations periods
(enacted both before and after the periods expired), almost always regarding the
prosecution of sex offenders, addressed in 2003 by the Court in Stogner v.
California.227 As the Table reflects, the study period also contains a significant
number of challenges to laws altering the right of convicted felons to possess
firearms. 8
The next category, "Monetary Sanctions," reflects the particular influence of
two distinct but related political causes taking hold in the 1990s: the victims'
rights movement229 and the increasing desire to shift the costs of prosecution and
custody to criminal defendants. 2" The former is reflected in challenges to laws
making changes to the required financial restitution of victims, which swept the
nation in revamped form in the 1990S.23 ' The latter is reflected in challenges to
... 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003). For discussion of Stogner, see supra notes 179-99 and
accompanying text.
" Two claims in this subcategory, both originating in California, challenged the
retroactive application ofa new lawprohibiting persons convicted of specified misdemeanors
from carrying firearms.
, See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMs' RIGHTS IN
CR!MINALTRIALS (1995); NAT'L VICTIM CTR., THE 1996 VICTIMS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK: A
COMPILATION AND COMPARISON OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS LEGISLATION (1996); Jeffrey Toobin,
Victim Power, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 24, 1997, at 40. For commentary on the unique
political potency of the movement, see JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: HOW WE TALK
ABouT NEW CRIMES AND NEW VICTIMS 119-41 (1999) (describing appeal of "the victim
industry"); Lynne Henderson, Co-opting Compassion: The Federal Victim's Rights
Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 591 (1998) (noting that "[i]ndividual victims and
victims' groups supporting punitive responses to crime have the public and legislative ear;
those that do not are ignored"). One telling piece of evidence of victims' influence during the
study period was the frequent effort by states to name tough anticrime measures after
particular victims. See Clifford J. Levy, A Wave ofNew Bills Bearing Victims'Names, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1999, at B5.
2 0 See, e.g., Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis is
Chronic, 9 CRIM. JUST. 13 (1994) (surveying instances of fee assessments in prosecutions);
cf PRIVATIZING THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM: POUCE, ADJUDICATION, AND
CORRECTIONS SERVICES FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1992)
(examining the growing role of private institutions in the criminal justice system).
'3' See MARKUSDIRKDUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THEUSE AND ABUSE OF
VICTIMS' RIGHTS 222-25 (2002).
[Vol. 12:439
2004] "DEMOCRATIC DESPOTISM" AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT 473
laws requiring defendants to pay for probation, prison or jail-related costs, to
repay the state for the costs of extradition, and "drug offender" surcharges, all
popular initiatives during the period. Challenges to fines, comprising just under
twenty-five percent of claims in the category, reflect the ongoing tendency of the
criminal justice system to expand its reach into "middleground" sanctions.232
"Judicial Administration," the next largest category, includes challenges to
legislative changes made to the functioning of the justice system, which taken
together reflect the system's broader tendency during the study period to toughen
the rules attending defendants' rights of recourse. The tendency assumed its most
high-profile form during the midpoint of the study period when Congress
undertook efforts to sharply limit the availability of federal habeas corpus for state
court defendants. 33 Consistent with this trend, the category includes challenges
to laws shortening the time for individuals to withdraw pleas and file for appeal
or post-conviction relief; expanding requirements for post-conviction relief and
appeal; limiting availability of bail; barring the capacity of sex offenders to seal
their records; and modifying joinder rules.
As its title implies, the next largest category, "Evidence," concerns challenges
to changes in evidentiary laws. Here again, the influence of the victims' rights
movement was felt, perhaps most notably, with Payne v. Tennessee, where the
Court reversed itself and permitted "victim impact" testimony in capital trials,
allowing survivors to provide emotional testimony on the losses caused by
homicides."" Similarly, in 1994, Congress made major changes to the Federal
232 See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal
and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992). Speaking to such changes in 1991, one
commentator noted that "[w]e are in the midst of fundamentally altering the way we approach
criminal justice problems. Law enforcement authorities are no longer content to fight crime
with the traditional methods of arrest, prosecution, and jailing." Mary M. Cheb,
Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives:
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
1325, 1413 (1991).
23 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1217 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)).
234 501 U.S. 808 (1991). For manifestations of this influence, see id. at 834 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the preclusion of such evidence "conflicts with a public sense of
justice keen enough that it has found voice in a nationwide 'victims rights' movement"); id.
at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the "majority has obviously been moved by an
argument that has strong political appeal but no proper place in a reasoned judicial opinion");
id. at 867 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (acknowledging "the political strength of the 'victims'
rights' movement"). For more on victim impact evidence see Wayne A. Logan, Through the
Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials,
41 ARIZ. L. REv. 143 (1999); cf Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Sentence
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Rules of Evidence, significantly broadening the admissibility of evidence of prior
sexual misconduct in sexual assault and child molestation cases,235 with imagery
of victims figuring prominently in legislative debates.236 Consistent with these
broader national shifts and deference to prosecutorial interests more generally, the
survey includes challenges to new laws allowing consideration of particular types
of evidence or testimony, including that relating to alleged prior sexual
misconduct or other forms of wrongdoing (regardless of whether a conviction
resulted); loosening hearsay restrictions; allowing the admission of victim impact
testimony; and limiting spousal privilege rules.23
Laws relating to capital sentencing, a common focus of legislatures since the
Supreme Court entered the constitutional fray in 1972 with its Furman decision,23
were also subject to ex post facto challenges during the study period. Challenges
were made to laws making changes in the availability of life without parole as a
sentencing option; the available methods of inflicting death; the definition and
existence of aggravating and mitigating factors; the respective roles of judge and
jury in death decision making; and the trial court's authority to resentence upon
remand from appellate courts.
"Jury/Trial Rights" categorizes challenges brought during the study period
against a broad variety of laws affecting the litigation rights of criminal
defendants. These changes included retroactive modifications to laws governing
the right to jury trial for particular offenses; the composition of juries; juror
removal; the extent of peremptory challenges available; and the joining or
bifurcation of different parts of criminal trials.
"Institutional Administration" captures challenges to laws modifying the
operation of prison and mental health facilities. Such challenges include those
against laws imposing limits on inmate visitation, correspondence, and
opportunities for education; modifying the criteria for inmate security
Recommendations in Capital Trials, 41 B.C. L. REv. 517 (2000) (examining the
permissibility of survivors' testimony in capital trials on the question of whether the
defendant should be sentenced to death).
35 See FED. R. Ev1D. 413-15.
236 See Michael S. Ellis, The Politics Behind Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and
415,38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 961 (1998); David P. Leonard, The FederalRules ofEvidence
and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URm. L.J. 305 (1995).
" The category also contains four claims challenging the Texas "outcry" statute
invalidated by the Court in Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
238 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding Georgia's capital sentencing
procedure unconstitutional). For a comprehensive examination of legislative and judicial
activity during the study period, see AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION
(James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
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classification, custody, and transfer, requiring inmates to undergo treatment; and
modifying requirements for transfer within and out of mental health institutions.
"Juvenile Justice," the last specialized category, contains claims almost
exclusively challenging jurisdictional changes to the juvenile justice system.
These claims involve either expansions of the juvenile court supervision period
or statutory changes making it easier to try juveniles as adults.239 Of the seventeen
claims in the category, sixteen concerned jurisdictional changes.
Finally, a handful of challenges did not admit of ready categorization, and
thus are relegated to the "Miscellaneous" category. Here, one finds a variety of
claims, including challenges to laws instructing juries that parole and good time
credits are potentially available to defendants and those easing the government's
capacity to obtain implied consent in drunk driving prosecutions.
Taken altogether, Table 1 illuminates the expansive efforts of states during the
study period to legislate in the criminal justice arena. On matters as diverse as sex
offender registration, sentence enhancements for first-time and recidivist
offenders, capital punishment, litigation rights of criminal defendants and inmates,
availability of parole or probation, and definition of crimes and defenses, the
states acted to toughen their treatment of those accused or convicted of crimes.
Overall the greatest number of claims broadly pertained to laws allegedly
increasing the quantum of punishment (Calder category three), a category that
historically has also received the most attention from the Supreme Court.2"
Category three claims are predominantly found in the enhancement, custody
modification, monetary sanctions, and post-custody sanction groupings but the
category is also implicated in claims contained within many of the remaining
groupings as well. A sizeable number of claims, however, related to Calder
category one, mainly classified here in the substantive criminal law grouping,
which suggests a greater concentration of legislative activity in this "core" area
of ex post facto concern than previously thought.24
" See generally Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems'Responses
to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME&JUSTICE 189 (1998); Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis theMenace
or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice,
35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 371 (1998).
240 Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997) (noting that the majority of ex post facto
challenges before the Court have involved an alleged increase in punishment).
24' See Krent, supra note 217, at 2147 (concluding that "Congress and state legislatures
have rarely threatened the core of the Ex Post Facto Clause, which prohibits criminalizing
an action that was innocent when done or increasing the severity ofa crime's classification").
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B. Rates of Success and Rationales
Table 2 reflects the success rates of the different types of ex post facto claims
adjudicated in state courts during the study period. This section provides an
overview of the rationales used by courts to resolve the claims, which, as the Table
suggests, did not enjoy a high degree of success during the study period.
1. Monetary Sanctions
Surprisingly, the category enj oying the highest rate of success overall during the
study period was that involving challenges to monetary sanctions. Notwithstanding
that the Supreme Court has held that monetary penalties in themselves do not
warrant designation as punishment for double jeopardy purposes2 42 and, by
extension, thus do not raise ex post facto concerns, 243 state courts during the study
period were receptive to the argument in its particulars. In each of nine instances,
California courts invalidated, on ex post facto grounds, a new law imposing a
probation or parole "revocation fine," on the rationale that the law retroactively
made punishment for a crime more burdensome after its commission (Calder
category three).2" Retroactively imposed fines for drunk driving and domestic
abuse convictions, 241 and a "restitution fine," 2" were also invalidated on ex post
facto grounds. Courts were far less amenable to invalidating laws that retroactively
imposed upon offenders "fees" and reimbursements, reasoning that they were
nonpunitive.247 However, several such cost-shifting laws were struck down, with
courts finding that they increased the quantum of punishment above that in effect
or scope of restitution owed were largely safe from challenge, as they were found
at the time the crime was committed.2" Laws retroactively increasing the amount
242 See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997).
24" See Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1086 n.6 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523
U.S. 1007 (1998).
24 As noted by one court, although the purpose of the revocation fine might not be
punitive, "its consequences to the defendant are severe enough that it qualifies as punishment
for purposes of the ex post facto clause." People v. Callejas, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363,365 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000).
245 See State v. Theriot, 00-870 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/30/01), 782 So. 2d 1078, 1086-87
(2001) (drunk driving); People v. Rayburn, 630 N.E.2d 533, 538 (I11. Ct. App. 1994)
(domestic abuse).
24 See People v. Zito, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491,493-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
247 See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 588 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Iowa 1998) (probation enrollment
fee); State ex rel. Nixon v. Taylor, 25 S.W.3d 566,568 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (reimbursement
for incarceration costs).
24 See, e.g., People v. Ellington, 854 P.2d 223, 224 (Colo. 1993) ("drug offender
surcharge"); People v. Slocum, 539 N.W.2d 572, 574 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (extradition
costs).
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TABLE 2: Types of Claims by Category and Rate of Success*
Overall Rate of Success: 189/1026 (18%)
Monetary Sanctions 25161 (41%) Sentence Enhancement 52/232 (22%)
Fine 13/14 (93%) First-offense 44/89(49%)
Fee/Reimbursement 8/23 (35%) Recidivist 8/143 (6%)
Restitution 4/24 (17%) Death Penalty 9/45(20%)
Custody Modification** 65/219 (30%) Evidence""** 2/47(4%)
Probation 6/7 (86%) Post-Custody Sanction 4/168(2%)
Probation/Parole Violation 5/15 (33%) Collateral Consequences 1/26(4%)
Parole 54/197 (27%) Registration/Notification 3/91 (3%)
Juvenile Justice 4/17(24%) Sex Offender Commitment 0/39 (0%)
Substantive Criminal Law 27/116 (23%) Expungement Refusal 0/12(0%)
Defense 5/5 (100%) Judicial Administration 1/55 (2%)
Crime 18/62 (29%) Jury/Trial Rights 0130(0%)
Felon-in-possession 2/23 (9%) Institutional Admin. 0/28(0%)
Statute of Limitations*** 1 2/26 (8%) Miscellaneous 0/8(0%)
* Table 2 reflects the disposition of claims in state courts during the study period (1992-2002), without
regard for the possible effects of subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. However, in the event
Westlaw indicated subsequent case history involving a reversal and remand from the Court during the
study period, such outcomes are reflected in the Table. Also, all percentages reported are rounded up
to the nearest whole number.
** During the study period, the U.S. Supreme Court issued several important decisions involving
challenges to parole regime changes. Again, consistent with the protocol used here, the claims were
coded in accord with their state court outcomes, unless the Court expressly reversed and remanded
during the study period. If this occurred, the claim was coded according to the Court's directive.
*** This category contains claims made against the California statute invalidated by the Supreme Court
in Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003), as well as similar laws in other states that revived
time-expired prosecutions, and claims extending limitations periods for prosecutions not yet time-
barred. The category also contains a single claim alleging improper retroactive application of a
shortened limitations period denied on the rationale that the pertinent time period in actuality was not
altered. The Stogner-type claims are coded to reflect their state court outcomes, without regard for the
Stogner decision, which was rendered after the end of the study period.
**** This category contains challenges to the Texas statute invalidated by the Supreme Court in
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000). The pre-2000 decisions are coded to reflect their state court
outcomes, and decisions rendered between 2000 and 2002 are coded to reflect the impact of Carmell,
per any subsequent Westlaw case history indicated.
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not to increase punishment;249 four courts concluded otherwise and invalidated
restitution on ex post facto grounds as an increase in punishment.250
2. Custody Modification
Laws affecting modifications to custody, the second largest category of claims
overall, warranted ex post facto relief thirty percent of the time. As noted above,
legislative activity here was brisk during the study period, and attracted the
Supreme Court's attention on several occasions. 5' Denials of relief for parole-
related changes were rationalized on several grounds in particular: (1) that limiting
parole release did not affect the quantum of incarceration imposed at sentencing; 52
(2) that predicating release on fulfillment of sex offender treatment did not increase
punishment;253 (3) that parole release, and the guidelines often used to reach such
decisions, are discretionary and hence changes made to eligibility do not increase
punishment;2" and (4) that laws relating to parole are "procedural," and hence do
not warrant ex post facto attention. 2" A number of claims, moreover, met with
defeat because courts concluded that the provision limiting parole release, whether
a guideline, regulation or rule, despite being authorized by the legislature, was not
within the ambit of ex post facto protection because it was not a "law. 256
249 See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 926 P.2d 105, 108 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); Commonwealth
v. Kline, 695 A.2d 872, 877 (Pa. Super. 1997).
250 See Eichelberger v. State, 916 S.W.2d 109, 110-12 (Ark. 1996); People v. Saelee, 40
Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Corwin, 616 N.W.2d 600, 602
(Iowa 2000); State v. McMann, 541 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
251 See supra notes 135-48 and accompanying text.
252 See, e.g., Rauso v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 762 A.2d 774, 775 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000), aff'd by 770 A.2d 309 (Pa. 2001) (per curiam).
253 See, e.g., Hall v. Zavaras, 916 P.2d 634, 637 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
4 See, e.g., Graham v. Norris, 10 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Ark. 2000).
2s5 See, e.g., Gaines v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 743 So. 2d 118, 122 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999).
256 See, e.g., Austin v. Div. of Parole, 717 N.Y.S.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000);
Bealler v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 740 N.E.2d 1100, 1101 (Ohio 2001); Commonwealth
v. O'Brian,811 A.2d 1068, 1070 (Pa. Super. 2002). It bears mentioning that Justice Scalia
recently endorsed just such a view. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 257-58 (2000)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that only a legislative change affecting frequency of parole
eligibility hearings, not an administrative one promulgated by a duly authorized parole board,
comes within the ambit of the Ex Post Facto Clause).
Notwithstanding that Calder itself actually involved a challenge to a "resolution or law"
of the Connecticut legislature, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), courts have
insisted that only laws come within the ambit of the Ex Post Facto Clause. It is for this reason
that the judiciary can make retroactive changes to the criminal law unfettered by ex post facto
constraints. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352-54 (1964) (holding that
retroactive judicial enlargements of the criminal law are regulated by Fourteenth Amendment
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Successful parole-related claims during the study period, to a significant degree,
reflected U.S. Supreme Court decisions issued during the period. For instance,
challenges to laws requiring the retroactive forfeiture of various types of
imprisonment time credits were granted on the basis of the Court's 1997 decision
in Lynce v. Mathis.2" So too were challenges to new laws retroactively requiring
that inmates serve a set percentage of their sentences before being eligible for
parole.25 s Challenges to retroactive changes to the timing and intervals of parole
consideration, in keeping with the case-specific test set forth in California
Due Process Clause, rather than by the Ex Post Facto Clause). Nonetheless, the cases
examined here make clear that courts apply ex post facto analysis to pattern jury instructions
tendered by judges that modify the law, even though such instructions lack legislative
imprimatur. See, e.g., Napier v. State, 46 S.W.3d 565, 568 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001) (granting
claim with regard to instruction making change to definition); Carinda v. State, 734 So. 2d
514, 515 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (denying claim); People v. Criss, 719 N.E.2d 776,784-85 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1999) (denying claim). Constitutional changes over time have also been subject to
ex post facto analysis. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866); State
v. Kavanaugh, 258 P. 209 (N.M. 1927). In Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 (1913), for
example, the Court held:
[The Ex Post Facto Clause has been regarded] as reaching every form in which
the legislative power of a State is exerted, whether it be a constitution, a
constitutional amendment, an enactment of the legislature, a by-law or ordinance
of a municipal corporation, or aregulation or order of some other instrumentality
of the State exercising delegated legislative authority.
Id. at 162-63.
A still unaddressed question is whether voter initiatives and referenda should warrant
ex post facto scrutiny. A product of Progressive Era reforms, such initiatives are self-
consciously populist attempts to sidestep the legislative process, yet are susceptible to the
same inflammatory influences affecting legislatures that the Ex Post Facto Clause is designed
to guard against. For discussion of the initiative process more generally, see CIZENs AS
LEGIsLATORs: DIREcTDEmocRAcY INTHEUNITED STATES (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998);
Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct
Democracy, and the Privatization ofthe Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 421 (1998);
Michael M. O'Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct Democracy: Lessons From the
Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 281 (2003). Professor Tribe, for one, is
inclined to conclude that the Bill of Attainder Clause, in many ways a companion provision,
also reposed in Article 1, should extend to popular referenda. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUrIONAL LAW § 10-4, at n.27 & § 10-6, at 658-59 (2d ed. 1988). For
more on the historically close kinship of the Bill of Attainder and the Ex Post Facto Clauses,
see infra notes 455, 471.
257 519 U.S. 433 (1997); see also McGee v. Snyder, 760 N.E.2d 982, 990 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001) (applying Lynce). For instances of pre-Lynce decisions granting relief on this basis,
see Gwong v. Singletary, 683 So. 2d 109, 114 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1142
(1997); Barger v. Peters, 645 N.E.2d 175, 177 ( . 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1102
(1995).
" See, e.g., McKnight v. State, 751 So. 2d 471, 475 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
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Department of Corrections v. Morales,259 succeeded when courts were convinced
that the disadvantage was more than merely "speculative. 260 Other successful
claims, such as those challenging laws newly requiring supervised, as opposed to
unsupervised, release or extending the period of supervised release, were also found
to violate Calder category three's prohibition of retroactive increases in
punishment.26'
Challenges to changes in the availability or conditions of probation were few
in number. Half of the successful claims challenged an amendment to an Oregon
law retroactively authorizing"split" probation sentences - incorporating jail terms
as a condition - which the courts deemed an increase in punishment.262 The
balance of successful claims, arising in other states, concerned retroactive limits on
the availability of deferred or suspended sentences, also deemed an increase in
punishment.
263
Finally, retroactive changes to laws regarding violation of probation and parole
conditions warranted relief thirty-three percent of the time. Of the fifteen claims
in the study, the vast majority (thirteen) related to new laws in California (ten) and
Florida (three), which changed the handling ofjuvenile probation violations.2" In
California, juveniles challenged the retroactive application of a new provision,
codified as a result of successful voter initiative Proposition 21, which modified
probation revocation hearings by permitting the use of hearsay to establish
violations; rescinding the prior requirement that the trial court expressly find that
the previous disposition was ineffective in rehabilitating thejuvenile; and lowering
the state's burden of proof in establishing the underlying violation (from beyond a
,9 514 U.S. 499 (1995). For discussion of Morales, see supra notes 135-42 and
accompanying text.
260 See, e.g., Miller v. Ignacio, 921 P.2d 882, 885 (Nev. 1996). For an instance of a
successful pre-Morales challenge on this basis, see Walker v. Klincar, 613 N.E.2d 295,297
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
2" See, e.g., Bollinger v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 920 P.2d 1111, 1114
(Or. Ct. App. 1996), aft'd, 992 P.2d 445 (1999).
262 See State v. Swartzendruber, 853 P.2d 842, 846 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Couraud,
848 P.2d 628, 629 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Harding, 840 P.2d 113, 114 (Or. Ct. App.
1992).
263 See People v. Perez, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 188, 193-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); People v.
Munoz, 857 P.2d 546, 548 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Reynolds, 642 A.2d 1368, 1371
(N.H. 1994).
264 In the two remaining claims, retroactive changes to the handling ofprobation violations
met with mixed results. See State v. Leistiko, 844 P.2d 97, 100 (Mont. 1992) (granting
challenge to law allowing modification of terms of suspended sentences); State v. Monson,
518 N.W.2d 171, 172-73 (N.D. 1994) (denying challenge to law allowing revocation of
probation after probation period had ended).
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reasonable doubt to a preponderance of the evidence)."' Juvenile petitioners whose
initial grant of probation occurred before the law's effective date, but alleged
misconduct occurred afterwards, challenged the law contending that its retroactive
application violated the fourth Calder category, resurrected by the Supreme Court
in 2000 in Carmell v. Texas. 66
In nine of ten instances, California appellate courts rebuffed challenges, 67
raising some question over both the jurisprudential effect of Carmell, and a
statement made by the Court in another case decided in 2000, Johnson v. United
States.268 In Johnson, while not reaching the merits of an ex post facto claim
challenging changes to a federal law governing revocation of supervised release,269
the Court stated that sanctions imposed as a result of revocation are to be conceived
as "part ofthe penalty for the initial offense.""27 According to the California courts,
the aforementioned language in Johnson amounted to dictum, 27 ' and otherwise
265 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 777 (West 2000).
266 529 U.S. 513 (2000). For discussion of Carmell, see supra notes 150-78 and
accompanying text.
267 See, e.g., In re Dustin R., No. E029356, 2002 WL 220338 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8,
2002); In re Lincoln F., No. A097292, 2002 WL 1988175 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 28,2002); In
re Brant 0., No. A096471 2002 WL 1753144 (Cal. Ct. App. July 29,2002). The California
Supreme Court agreed to hear one such challenge in July 2001; as of this writing oral
argument has not yet been set. See John L. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001), rev. granted, 26 P.3d 1040 (Cal. 2001).
268 529 U.S. 694 (2000).
2"9 The Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits over whether the
new provision constituted retroactive punishment, with the split arising over whether
revocation amounted to punishment for the underlying conviction, occurring before the law's
effective date, or the violation of supervised release that occurred afterwards. See id. at
698-99. The Court, however, ultimately failed to decide whether retroactive application
violated ex post facto doctrine, instead concluding that Congress did not intend for the law
to be retroactively applied, and the trial court thus lacked authority to invoke the new law.
Id. at 701-03.
270 Id. at 700; see also id. at 701 (stating that the Court "attribute[s] postrevocation
penalties to the original conviction"). The Court added that "such treatment is all but entailed
by our summary affirmance of Greenfield v. Scafati in which a three-judge panel forbade on
ex post facto grounds the application of a Massachusetts statute imposing sanctions for
violation of parole to a prisoner originally sentenced before its enactment." Id. (citing
Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967), summarily aftid, 390 U.S. 713
(1968)).
271 Whether the Johnson Court's language amounted to dictum is of course highly
questionable because, as noted, the Court granted certiorari to "resolve the conflict[]" among
circuits over whether the law concerned "revocation and reimprisonment... for the original
offense" or punishment for violation of the conditions imposed on Johnson. Johnson, 529
U.S. at 699. The Court devoted several paragraphs to discussing the issue, and only then
proceeded to assess whether Congress intended the law to be retroactive - a question not
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lacked binding effect because, unlike the federal law in question in Johnson, the
newjuvenile revocation law did not authorize any new or increased sanctions in the
event of revocation.272 Rather, the new law merely changed "the standards and
evidentiary rules" for determining whether revocation is appropriate, triggering
application of harsher sanctions contained in the preexisting law.273 As a result, the
change was in keeping with what the California courts considered key language in
Carmell, where the Court at one point broadly acknowledged (before assessing the
category four claim) that "[t]he critical question [for ex post facto purposes] is
whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its
effective date." '74 Furthermore, while the new law reduced the "nature and
quantum of evidence" necessary to revoke a juvenile's probation, it could be
applied consistently with Carmell, because the key date for retroactivity purposes
is when the alleged violation occurred (not the date of the predicate conviction).275
According to one panel of the California Court of Appeals:
It bears repeating that the critical question when analyzing a claimed ex
post violation is whether the challenged law changes the legal
consequences of acts completed before its effective date. Although
change in the array of sanctions available at the time of the original
offense alters the legal consequences of the original conduct and renders
the date of the original offense pivotal for purpose of an ex post facto
analysis of changes in probation revocation sanctions, changes in the
procedural standards and evidentiary rules for determining whether a
juvenile has engaged in later conduct warranting revocation of
probation does not alter the legal consequences ofacts completed before
actually raised by the litigants. See id. at 699-702. As these California cases make clear,
Johnson did nothing to clarify the important question of how retroactivity is to be assessed
for purposes of revocation, likely serving to inspire continued confusion among the courts.
272 See John L. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209, 217-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001),
rev. granted, 26 P.3d 1040 (Cal. 2001).
273 Id. at 219.
274 Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513,520 (2000) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,
31(1981)).
275 John L., 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220. The California court based its inference on language
at the very outset of Carmell, setting forth the procedural posture of the case, where the
Supreme Court noted that Carmell did not contest eleven of his fifteen convictions, either
because at the time of the particular instances of alleged sexual abuse the applicable
evidentiary law allowed for conviction, or the misconduct at issue admittedly occurred after
the new law took effect. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 519-20. Carnell, however, omits any
discussion of how retroactivity is to be assessed, and the Carmell majority's condemnation
of Texas's application of its new evidentiary law to Carmel's earlier, preenactment behavior
suggests a contrary understanding.
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its effective date if the conduct constituting the probation violation
occurs after the effective date of the statute.76
Taken together, the aforementioned cases highlight a decided effort to minimize
the language in Johnson, suggesting that for ex post facto purposes the date of the
initial misconduct warranting probation, not the alleged misconduct serving as a
basis to revoke, should serve as the trigger date for retroactivity purposes. The
cases also highlight a decidedly narrow reading of the fourth Calder category,
disregarding the Carmell Court's explicit concern over whether the state's
evidentiary burden is unfairly eased, regardless of whether punishment is increased
under the new law (actually a Calder category three concern).277 As a result, while
presumably California would be precluded from retroactively increasing the
sanctions for a probation violation, it nonetheless remains free to ease the method
by which it can justify revocation and thus impose previously available sanctions,
themselves harsher than those imposed at the time of initial adjudication.27
In the Florida cases, juveniles challenged the retroactive application of a new
law that removed the six-year cap on sentences in existence when the juveniles
committed the offenses leading to probation.'" In all three challenges, Florida
courts granted relief.20 In the most recent decision, the petitioner challenged his
fifteen-year sentence, imposed pursuant to the new law.2 ' Like other courts before
it, the court of appeals concluded that the crucial date for ex post facto retroactivity
purposes was the date on which the petitioner committed the criminal act leading
to probation, not the date on which the probation violation occurred.282 To hold
otherwise, the court reasoned, would "clearly serve[] to increase the length of
incarceration to which he could be subject," and hence violate Calder category
three.283
7 6 In re Lincoln F., No. No. A097292, 2002 WL 1988175, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 28,
2002) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
217 Carmell, 529 U.S. at531-33. Indeed, in Carmell the Texas Legislature didnot increase
the punishment Carmell faced, but rather only made easier the government's means of
winning a conviction and hence a prison term.
278 California courts have either disagreed with or distinguished the sole decision in the
survey granting ex post facto relief with regard to the new juvenile probation revocation law.
See In re Melvin J., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 917, 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
279 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 958.04(2)(a) & 958.14 (West 2003).
280 See Windom v. State, 835 So. 2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Darden v.
State, 641 So. 2d 431,432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Reeves v. State, 605 So. 2d 562, 562
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
21 Windom, 835 So. 2d at 1174-75.
282 Id. at 1175.
23 id.
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3. Juvenile Justice
Ex post facto claims based on changes in the treatment of juvenile offenders
achieved success twenty-four percent of the time. Here, the most common
contention was that laws either broadening the capacity of authorities to transfer
juveniles to adult court, or lengthening the temporal jurisdiction of juvenile court
supervision (for example, from eighteen to twenty-one years of age), violated
Calder category three. With respect to the former, courts typically concluded that
transfer was procedural in nature, and hence permissible for ex post facto purposes,
despite rendering juveniles subject to harsher adult sanctions. 84 However, the
Montana Supreme Court deemed ex post facto a law that retroactively expanded the
authority of courts to transfer juveniles to adult probation and parole supervision,
thereby both expanding the duration of such supervision, and creating the risk of
adult jail time. 85 Similarly, the Illinois Court of Appeals barred retroactive
application of a law requiring (as opposed to permitting) that juveniles convicted
of murder be transferred to the adult system, exposing them to a harsher range of
potential punishment.2 6 The change in the law was therefore "substantive and not
procedural." 28
7
Laws lengthening the duration of juvenile court jurisdiction, and hence
supervision, met with more mixed results. According to the Missouri Court of
Appeals, juvenile jurisdiction by definition is civil in nature and hence not subject
to ex post facto constraints.2"" On the other hand, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
prohibited retroactive application of a law extending jurisdiction of the juvenile
court past the age of eighteen, reasoning that it increased the quantum of
punishment imposed on juveniles.2"9
4. Sentence Enhancements and Substantive Criminal Law Changes
Changes to laws affecting sentence enhancements and those making changes
to the substantive criminal law achieved about equal measures of success. With
respect to enhancements, Calder category number three was typically invoked. In
addressing such claims, courts drew a clear distinction between first-time offenders
24 See, e.g., In re M.C., 745 N.E.2d 122, 126-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); In re Fultz, 535
N.W.2d 590, 595 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 554 N.W.2d 725 (Mich.
1996); State v. Walls, 775 N.E.2d 829, 841-42 (Ohio 2002).
28 See In re Young, 983 P.2d 985, 988 (Mont. 1999).
286 See In re R.T., 729 N.E.2d 889, 896-97 (Il. App. Ct. 2000).
287 Id. at 897.
288 See In re RLC, Jr., 967 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
289 See State v. Adam M., 953 P.2d 40,42-43 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
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and recidivists, being far more inclined to grant relief to the former. For example,
courts invalidated laws that retroactively increased the statutory maximum or
mandatory minimum prison terms of offenders;29 increased the prescribed amount
of prison time for particular offenses;29" ' added a post-release condition (completion
of a sex offender treatment program) threatening re-imprisonment in the event of
failure;292 or introduced a new basis for sentence enhancement (for example, firearm
use, commission of a crime while on prison release, or sexual motivation).293 On
the other hand, challenges were rejected when the law involved only a technical
clarification of a preexisting sentence-related law;294 actually did not serve to
increase the amount of prison time permitted;295 or failed to qualify as actual
punishment (for example, requiring specimens for HIV or DNA analysis or
removing home confinement as a sentencing option).296
Recidivist laws proved virtually impregnable to ex post facto challenges. In
over ninety percent of claims, courts reasoned that laws increasing the punishment
for recidivist offenders did not run afoul of the third Calder category. Typically
this was because, rather than retroactively increasing punishment for the initial
offense, the new laws were seen as enhancing punishment for the most recent
misconduct.2" Similarly, new laws expanding the "cleansing period," the temporal
window used to count prior convictions for purposes of deeming an offender a
recidivist, were deemed permissible because they did not enhance the punishment
29" See, e.g., Fleming v. State, 523 S.E.2d 315,318 (Ga. 1999); Lozier v. Commonwealth,
32 S.W.3d 511,514 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000); McGowan v. State, 742 So. 2d 1183, 1187 (Miss.
Ct. App. 1999).
291 See, e.g., People v. Bennett, No. A094648, 2002 WL 70687 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18,
2002) (child molestation); Holtapp v. City ofFayetteville, 431 S.E.2d 403,405 (Ga. Ct. App.
1993) (driving under the influence); State v. Jackson, 896 S.W.2d 77, 84 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995) (sodomy).
292 See Purvis v. Commonwealth, 14 S.W.3d 21, 24 (Ky. 2000).
13 See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 866 P.2d 677, 682-83 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (sexual
motivation), review granted 879 P.2d 293 (Wash. 1994), affd 890 P.2d 457 (Wash. 1995).
294 See, e.g., People v. Cherkendov, No. B 147347,2002 WL 1065563, at *9-10 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 28, 2002).
295 See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 40 P.3d 611,622-25 (Utah 2002).
296 See, e.g., People v. Adames, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 631,639-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (HIV);
Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699, 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (DNA); State v. Desjarlais,
731 A.2d 716, 718 (R.I. 1999) (home confinement). Courts, not surprisingly, also rejected
arguments that new laws decreasing punishment must be retroactively applied, reasoning that
the Ex Post Facto Clause does not affirmatively require application of laws with ameliorative
effects. See, e.g., State v. Woodman, 702 N.E.2d 974, 978 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Pierce v.
State, 526 S.E.2d 222, 226-27 (S.C. 2000).
297 See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 745 A.2d 1165, 1169 (N.J. 2000); State v. Carpenter, 573
S.E.2d 668, 676 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Clever, 70 S.W.3d 771, 776-77 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2001).
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for the prior offense.298 Another basis for rejecting such challenges was simply that
the law preceded the date of the offense(s) in question.299 On those rare (eight)
occasions in which courts found ex post facto violations, it was reasoned that the
enhancements were enacted after the offender committed the latter crime triggering
recidivist status.3°'
Legislative changes to the substantive criminal law potentially implicate several
of the Calder categories. Laws modifying the definition of already existing
criminal prohibitions, creating new crimes, or altering burdens of proof, typically
draw into question whether the first or fourth Calder categories have been violated.
Success here should perhaps come as no surprise given that such laws can be readily
distinguished merely by comparing when the conduct occurred against the effective
date of the legislation in question.30 1 Courts, however, were not always quick to
summarily conclude that the effective date of new laws is dispositive and compels
constitutional relief. Indeed, the majority of the time relief was denied, with
rationales including that the law in question merely clarified an extant criminal
provision;" 2 did not disadvantage the defendant;0 3 actually was contained in the
statute books in some form when the behavior in question occurred;3" or (most
commonly) addressed behavior occurring before and after the effective date and
hence was a continuing crime.3"5 Challenges to laws expanding the categories of
persons (convicted felons, almost without exception) prohibited from owning or
298 See, e.g., State v. Chapman, 685 A.2d 423,425 (Me. 1996); State v. Watkins, 939 P.2d
1243, 1245 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
299 See, e.g., People v. Connell, No. C037771, 2002 WL 1064090, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
May 28, 2002).
" See, e.g., Richardson v. Moore, 754 So. 2d 64, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Settle v.
State, 709 N.E.2d 34, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Robinson, 713 So. 2d 828, 832 (La.
Ct. App. 1998).
301 See, e.g., Lepak v. State, 707 So. 2d 805, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (domestic
violence); State v. Chittim, 775 A.2d 381, 384 (Me. 2001) (defacing license plate); State v.
Price, 59 P.3d 1122, 1125-27 (Mont. 2002) (felonious nonsupport); State v. Sears, 774
N.E.2d 357,360 (Ohio Com. Pl. 2002) (student-teacher contact); State v. George W. H., 439
S.E.2d 423,429-30 (W. Va. 1993) (sexual abuse by a person with custodial authority).
302 See, e.g., Carlson v. State, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D2162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
311 See, e.g., State v. Warren, 499 S.E.2d 431,452-53 (N.C. 1998); State v. Ashcraft 859
P.2d 60, 64-66 (Wash. Ct App. 1993).
'n4 See People v. Trammel, 723 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Sparkman v.
State, 997 S.W.2d 660, 668-69 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
305 See People v. Grant, 973 P.2d 72, 78 (Cal. 1999) (sexual abuse of a child); People v.
Koeppel, 646 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (rent gouging); Gilsonv. State,
8 P.3d 883, 915 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (child abuse), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 962 (2001);
State v. Zelinka, 882 P.2d 624,629 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (murder by abuse); State v. Pelz, 765
A.2d 824, 830-31 (R.I. 2001) (felony failure to pay child support); State v. Ramirez, 633
N.W.2d 656,662 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (identity theft).
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possessing a firearm under pain of punishment were denied on the ground that they
did not retroactively punish the earlier, preenactment offense, but rather the "new"
offense of owning or possessing a firearm.3" Two courts rejected claims on the
rationale that the prohibition, despite carrying criminal consequences for its
violation, was regulatory in nature and hence not subject to ex post facto limits.30 7
In the words of one of the courts, the new law was "aimed not at punishment but at
protecting public safety through firearm regulation."30 8 The two courts granting
relief implicitly found new firearm-related laws to be punitive, and concluded that
the expanded prohibitory reach of the laws in effect increased the punishment of
prior conduct."0 9
Statutory changes to criminal law defenses met with uniform disapproval,
despite the absence among the Calder categories of any express reference to
defenses.1 In four of the five cases, changes regarding the proof requirements of
insanity were altered to the disadvantage of defendants. Illinois courts, *on two
occasions, found ex post facto fault with changes that increased defendants' burden
of proving insanity (from a "preponderance" to "clear and convincing") and
otherwise changed elements of the defense.3 1' The Illinois Supreme Court
concluded that the abolition of an affirmative defense such as insanity is ex post
facto because "'it expands the scope of a criminal prohibition after the act is
done.' 3 12 Using language evocative of Calder category four, the court concluded
that abolition of the defense made it "easier for the state to secure a conviction.
' 31 3
Appellate courts in Michigan and Ohio, likewise, found that changes to their
respective insanity laws effectively altered the evidentiary standard and made
conviction easier, resulting in an ex post facto violation 1 4 In the final case granting
ex post facto relief, the Illinois Court of Appeals reversed a conviction based on a
new law making it easier for the state to rebut evidence of police entrapment, citing
" See, e.g., People v. Mills, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 310, 314-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
307 See State v. Adams, 840 P.2d 745, 747 (Or. 1992); State v. Thiel, 524 N.W.2d 641,
645 (Wis. 1994).
'm Thiel, 524 N.W.2d at 645.
31 See Statev. Trower, 629 N.W.2d 594,598 (S.D. 2001); Goodman v. State, 935 S.W.2d
184, 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
310 The defense category, as discussed earlier, formally surfaced first in Beazell v. Ohio,
269 U.S. 167 (1925) and was repeated in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990). See
supra notes 88-99, 117-31 and accompanying text.
3 See People v. Ramsey, 735 N.E.2d 533, 534 (Ill. 2000); People v. Gill, 713 N.E.2d
124, 128 (Il. App. Ct. 1999).
312 Ramsey, 735 N.E.2d at 535 (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,49 (1990)).
313 Id.
314 See People v. McRunels, 603 N.W.2d 95,97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Luff, 621
N.E.2d 493, 498-99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
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Collins for the proposition that the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated when a defense
available at the time of the offense is withdrawn."'
Finally, during the study period the courts were decidedly averse to challenges
to laws that revive prosecutions otherwise barred by expired statutes of limitations,
ultimately deemed ex post facto by the U.S. Supreme Court in Stogner v. California
in 2003."6 In fifteen of seventeen cases (eighty-eight percent), courts concluded
that the laws were procedural in nature and therefore did not warrant ex post facto
protection.1 7 The California Supreme Court, in a decision serving as precedent for
the lower court opinion in Stogner, adopted a different tact. In People v. Frazer,3m8
the court, invoking Collins for the narrow proposition that the Clause only bars laws
that "alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts, '319
held that the revival statute did neither and barred relief.32 By contrast, two state
courts during the period found revival statutes to be ex post facto, in both instances
granting relief without meaningful elaboration.32' Finally, in the balance of cases
courts uniformly rejected ex post facto claims against laws extending unexpired
limitations periods, 322 a legal change that the Stogner Court itself was at pains to
distinguish as permissible. 23
5. Death Penalty
If special concern were to be warranted over any type of retroactive law
making, that relating to capital punishment would appear especially deserving.
However, as Table 2 reflects, such concern is not manifest in rates of success. In
5 See People v. Criss, 719 N.E.2d 776,783-85 (111. App. Ct. 1999).316 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003). For discussion of Stogner see supra notes 179-99 and
accompanying text.
317 See, e.g., Christmas v. State, 700 So. 2d 262, 266-67 (Miss. 1997); State v. Wright,
38 P.3d 772, 774 (Mont 2001).
318 982 P.2d 180 (Cal. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000).
3I9 Id. at 192 (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990)). The Court
elaborated that "Collins made clear that the two categories of impermissible retroactive
legislation - redefining criminal conduct and increasing punishment - are exclusive." Id.
32 The Frazer court further concluded the revival statute did not rescind an available
defense because it did not, as required by Collins, affect the "definition" or "elements" of the
crime charged or modify "an excuse or justification for the conduct underlying such a
charge." Id. at 192-93 (quoting Collins, 497 U.S. at 50).
32' See State v. Wiemer, 533 N.W.2d 122, 132 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995); Murphy v. State,
871 P.2d 916, 919 (Nev. 1994).
322 See, e.g., State v. Schultzen, 522 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Iowa 1994); State v. Martin, 643
A.2d 946, 948 (N.H. 1994). In addition, one other ex post facto claim was rejected because
the limitations period was not actually changed to the defendant's disadvantage. See State v.
Ricci, 914 S.W.2d 475, 477-81 (Tenn. 1996).
323 Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2453-54 (2003).
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rejecting claims, the Supreme Court's 1977 decision inDobbert v. Florida324 played
a pivotal role. In Dobbert, discussed above, 325 the Court held that no ex post facto
violation occurs if a new law does not alter "substantial personal rights," but merely
alters "modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance. '326 When
Dobbert committed his crime, Florida law permitted death unless a majority of
jurors recommended life. A new law, used at trial, permitted the judge to impose
death, perhaps over the life recommendation of the jury, based on statutorily
prescribed findings. The Dobbert Court concluded that the changes were
procedural and ameliorative inasmuch as under the old law death was "presumed"
unless the jury voted in favor of mercy.327 The Dobbert Court also concluded that
no ex post facto violation occurred by virtue of Florida's death penalty law being
invalid when the crime was committed, reasoning that its presence on the statute
books served as an "operative fact" that the state might target eligible killers with
death.328
Applying Dobbert, courts during the study period regularly deemed changes to
capital regimes procedural and hence permissible. For instance, claims were
rejected with regard to new Oklahoma and Pennsylvania laws that authorized full
sentencing proceedings by juries on remand in the event error is discovered on
appeal, in lieu of prior laws requiring automatic imposition of life by the appellate
Court.3 29 Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld retroactive application of
a law that, as in Dobbert, altered the roles ofjudge and jury in capital decisions.3
Also, again as inDobbert, courts rejected ex post facto challenges based on capital
sentences imposed pursuant to laws that were constitutionally invalid on the
rationale that the laws served as "operative fact[s]."33' Using similar reasoning, the
Mississippi Supreme Court rejected an ex post facto claim brought by a defendant
who committed his crime when the state mandated death for all convicted
murderers,332 an approach invalidated by the Supreme Court.333 At the defendant's
trial, the State used its new capital statute, under which death was not mandated but
rather decided in an independent proceeding on the basis of aggravating and
324 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
325 See supra notes 100-16 and accompanying text.
326 Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925)).
327 id.
328 Id. at 298.
329 See, e.g., Nguyen v. State, 844 P.2d 176, 181 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Wharton, 665 A.2d 458, 460 (Pa. 1995).
330 Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d 1174, 1187 (Del. 1997).
33, See, e.g., State v. Cobb, 743 A.2d 1, 92 (Conn. 1999).
332 Johnston v. State, 618 So. 2d 90, 95-96 (Miss. 1993).
333 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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mitigating circumstances. The changes, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded,
were "ameliorative and procedural."
33 4
Relying on Collins (and Beazell), rather than Dobbert, courts rejecting claims
also attached particular importance to the fact that changes to the death decision-
making process did not affect the quantum of potential punishment, change the
definition of a crime, or deprive the defendant of a defense. For instance, the
Louisiana Supreme Court rejected an ex post facto claim against a new law
allowing jurors to be instructed that in the event death was imposed commutation
by the governor was possible, reasoning that the change did not function to increase
punishment.3 Laws elevating the importance of prior convictions were upheld on
the rationale that they did not increase the punishment for the previous crime, but
rather heightened the culpability of the killing being prosecuted (as with
enhancement claims more generally, noted above). 36 Laws making changes to the
method by which death was imposed, as the Supreme Court concluded in several
cases in the early twentieth century,3" also failed to garner ex post facto relief.3
The increasing availability of life without parole (LWOP) during the study
period led to some interesting results worthy of mention. Several courts deemed the
new option ameliorative (compared to death) and thus rejected efforts by death row
inmates to invoke the Ex Post Facto Clause to require its retroactive application. 39
Under particular facts, however, courts granted ex post facto relief when the LWOP
option was retroactively applied. In State v. Willie, for instance, the Oregon
Supreme Court held that the Clause barred retroactive imposition of LWOP as a
presumptive sentence (not a term of thirty years) in the event death was not
imposed.3" In State v. Conner,"' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
LWOP was not ameliorative compared to the noncapital option (life) in effect at the
time of the killings, and that the Clause thus barred the jury from being informed,
" Johnston, 618 So. 2d at 95.
... See State v. Loyd, 96-1805 (La. 2/13/97), 689 So. 2d 1321, 1326 (1997).
336 See, e.g., Arthur v. State, 711 So. 2d 1031, 1063--64 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); People
v. Sims, 658 N.E.2d 413,431 (Ill. 1995); see also People v. Schulman, 658 N.Y.S.2d 794,
797-98 (N.Y. 1997) (rejecting challenge to new law authorizing consideration of other
killing that occurred within a twenty-four-hour period to permit the elevation of the charge
to first-degree murder).
117 See supra note 133.
338 See Langford v. State, 951 P.2d 1357, 1361-62 (Mont. 1997); In re Benn, 952 P.2d
116,149 (Wash. 1998).
I" See Brantleyv. State, 486 S.E.2d 169, 172 (Ga. 1997); Conleyv. State, 790 So.2d 773,
803 (Miss. 2001).
m 858 P.2d 128, 139 (Or. 1993); see also Salazar v. State, 859 P.2d 517, 518-19 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1993).
14' 480 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. 1997).
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as required by the new law, that if death was not imposed the defendant would be
ineligible for parole.342
Successful capital-related claims in the main were based on new laws increasing
the variety of factual circumstances codified as aggravating factors for juries to
consider when deciding life or death, serving to heighten the chances that death
would result. Florida courts, for instance, reversed and remanded death sentences
based upon the new aggravator that the underlying murder was committed while the
defendant was released in the community on felony probation.343 Likewise, a new
law making the advanced age of victims an aggravator warranted ex post facto
relief.3 " The Arkansas Supreme Court invalidated a capital sentence based on a
new aggravating factor singling out "cruel or depraved" killings; the court "[could]
hardly say that a 'standard' for application of the death penalty is merely
procedural. We regard it as a substantive provision that cannot be applied
retroactively." '345
6. Evidence
Retroactive legislative changes to the rules of evidence have inspired particular
confusion among courts over the years. Indeed, until the Supreme Court in Carmell
v. Texas 46 rehabilitated the fourth Calder category expressly relating to such
changes, claims were reflexively deemed as procedural in nature and hence not
worthy of constitutional relief. Statutory changes permitting the admission of victim
impact testimony, which allows survivors to describe homicide victims' positive traits
and their personal and economic loss occurring as a result of the killing,34 7 provide
a ready illustration of this. In fifteen of sixteen challenges, courts characterized the
" Id. Although the court deemed the prospect "speculative and unsupported by any
evidence in the record," id. at 631, a substantial body of empirical research supports the view
that providing the option of LWOP to capital sentencing juries reduces the likelihood of
death being imposed. See, e.g., WilliamJ. Bowers &Benjamin D. Steiner,DeathByDefault:
An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEx.
L. REv. 605, 671-702 (1999); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Deadly Paradox of Capital
Jurors, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 390-97 (2001).
See, e.g., Lebron v. State, 799 So. 2d 997, 1019-20 (Fla. 2001).
3" See State v. Hootman, 709 So. 2d 1357, 1360-61 (Fla. 1998).
-45 Bowen v. State, 911 S.W.2d 555, 562-64 (Ark. 1995).
The sole other successful claim during the study period turned on a more particularized
feature of the state law challenged. In People v. Aguayo, 840 P.2d 336, 339 (Colo. 1992),
the Colorado Supreme Court held that death could not be imposed when the savings
provisions ofa capital law, later invalidated, specified that in the absence of the death penalty
life must be imposed.
36 529 U.S. 513 (2000). For discussion of Carmell, see supra notes 150-78 and
accompanying text.
17 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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changes as merely procedural and only affecting the scope of evidence permitted,348
notwithstanding that the changes permitted juries to impose harsher sentences than
before based on evidence that was previously irrelevant (indeed unconstitutional) 3 49
Other courts, on similar reasoning, rejected challenges to retroactive application of
laws expanding the consideration at trial of prior convictions350 and uncharged
misconduct."' In a case highlighting the close relation of evidentiary rules to the
elements of crimes themselves, the South Dakota Supreme Court concluded that in
the context of a new stalking law, the state could use "other acts" evidence occurring
before the law's enactment to support the statutory elements of "intent" and "course
of conduct."352 Despite its role in satisfying the elements of stalking, the Court
concluded that "[i]n this case, we are considering the admissibility of other acts
evidence, not the 'retroactive alteration of a defined crime or an increase in
punishment.' 353
The only two cases granting relief during the study period both concerned the
Texas "outcry" statute ultimately invalidated by the Court in Carmell. In one case,
relief was granted before Cannell was decided; 31 in the other, after the Court issued
its decision.355
The very low rate of success for fourth category Calder challenges should
perhaps come as no surprise given that for all but two years in the study period the
category was in jurisprudential limbo. It is important to note, however, that in cases
decided after Carmell, as apparent in the discussion above regarding California's
treatment of changes to probation revocation standards, courts have interpreted the
category narrowly.356 Rather than focusing on the Carmell majority's avowed
concern over retroactive changes to evidentiary rules that are "advantageous only to
the State, to facilitate an easier conviction," 3" as emphasized in Calder itself,
3 58
34s See, e.g., Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 653 (Fla. 1997); Speed v. State, 512 S.E.2d
896, 906 (Ga. 1999); State v. Clark, 990 P.2d 793, 810 (N.M. 1999).
349 Indeed, in many jurisdictions victim impact evidence is classified as a statutory
aggravator in death penalty decisions. See Logan, supra note 234, at 170-71.
350 See, e.g., People v. Fitch, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 761 (Cal. App. 3d 1997); Bunn v.
Commonwealth, 466 S.E.2d 744, 746 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
351 See, e.g., People v. Balle, 601 N.E.2d 788, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); State v. Douglas,
917 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Brooks v. State, 822 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992).
352 State v. McGill, 536 N.W.2d 89,91 (S.D. 1995).
"I Id. at 93 (quoting Cal. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995)).
314 See Bowers v. State, 914 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
311 See Gagliardo v. State, 78 S.W.3d 469, 478 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
356 See supra notes 267-78 and accompanying text.
317 Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 (2000) (stating that "[t]here is plainly a
fundamental fairness interest... in having the government abide by the rules of law it
establishes to govern the circumstances under which it can deprive a person of his or her
liberty or life").
351 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798) (condemning laws that "change
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courts have demonstrated a decided propensity to focus on the majority's concern
over laws changing "the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a conviction."359
For instance, several California decisions have rejected ex post facto claims
against a new law permitting propensity evidence in sexual abuse trials.36
Distinguishing the Texas law at issue in Carmell as one improperly lessening the
quantum of evidence, the California law "simply added a new type of evidence
which the jury may consider when deciding the charge has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt," and hence "falls squarely within Collins rather than Carmell."36 '
Using similar reasoning, the Texas Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to a law
permitting evidence of uncharged criminal sexual acts, previously admissible only
under limited conditions. 62 Again, the Court distinguished Carmell, concluding
that the new law "simply provides that a specific type of evidence will be
admissible."363 "Here, the question is the admissibility of the evidence, not whether
the properly admitted evidence is sufficient to convict .... ,,6 Referencing
language in Carmell, the Texas court stated:
Though it is correct to say that the admissibility of evidence under [the new
law] runs in the State's favor, the retrospective application of the statute
cannot be said to violate the ex post facto clause on this basis alone. The
statute does not alter the quantum of proof required for conviction.3 "
Finally, in State v. Dionne, the Florida Court of Appeals rejected an ex post
facto challenge to a new law allowing the admission of an extrajudicial confession
the rules of evidence,for the purpose of conviction").
"' Carmell, 529 U.S. at 530 (emphasis added). As noted by Justice Ginsburg in her
dissent joined by three colleagues, the majority's constitutional concern that the Texas law
improperly required "less testimony... to convict" could be taken to extend to numerous
other evidentiary laws, including the felon competency rule long ago condoned in Hopt.
There, as in Carmell, "a conviction based on evidence previously deemed inadmissible was
sustained pursuant to a broadened rule regarding the competency of testimonial evidence."
Id. at 571 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
' See People v. Moreno, No. HO18928,2002 WL 433037 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14,2002),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 450 (2002); People v. Schroeder, No. HO 18928, 2002 WL 436944
(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2002); People v. Mejia, No. F034801, 2002 WL 273764 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 26, 2002).
3' Mejia, 2002 WL 273764, at *12; see also Schroeder, 2002 WL 436944, at *8
(concluding that the challenged law "deems more evidence relevant and makes more
evidence admissible, but it does not thereby eliminate or lower the quantum of proof required
or in any way reduced the prosecutor's burden or proof').
362 McCulloch v. State, 39 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. Ct App. 2001).
363 Id. at 684.
364 Id.
365 Id.
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in the absence of independent evidence establishing the corpus delicti of the
crime. 6 The Dionne court reasoned that the change was a "procedural rule of
evidence" that did not alter the "evidence necessary to support a conviction."
Despite lifting a prohibition on confessions, perhaps the most compelling piece of
evidence at the state's disposal,36 the statutory change was found to merely
"regulate[] the mode in which facts constituting guilt may be placed before the
"ury.1 369
7. Other Categories
As Table 2 reflects, the remaining categories, "Post-Custody Sanctions,"
"Judicial Administration," "Jury/Trials Rights," "Institutional Administration," and
"Miscellaneous," overall accounted for a very low rate of success. Claims in the
"Post-Custody Sanctions" category achieved the only meaningful measure of
success, and there it was very limited. Overwhelmingly, the courts deemed the
sanctions nonpunitive in nature, and hence outside ex post facto protection,3 71 or in
the context of violations of newly imposed sex-offender registration requirements,
permissible because the laws punished only the new crime of failing to comply with
the new requirements."' In a handful of cases, laws in the"Post-Custody" category
were deemed punitive and warranted ex post facto relief because courts reasoned
that they retroactively increased the quantum of punishment experienced by
petitioners. 2
3" 814 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002).
367 Id. at 1094-95.
3" See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
266 (1996) (citing studies showing significant influence of confessions amongjurors); Welsh
S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy
Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 105 (1997); see also Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574,
585 (1884) (characterizing a confession as "the strongest evidence against the party making
it").
369 Dionne, 814 So. 2d at 1094. For a vigorous defense of the corpus delicti rule, with
emphasis on its crucial role in preventing the admission of unreliable confessions, see David
A. Moran, In Defense of the Corpus Delicti Rule, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 817 (2003).
"' See, e.g., Toia v. People, 776 N.E.2d 599,604-05 (111.2002) (refusal to expunge drunk
driving conviction); State v. Flam, 587 N.W.2d 767, 768-69 (Iowa 1998) (drivers' license
revocation); Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (sex offender
registration requirement); Petersen v. State, 36 P.3d 1053, 1055 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (sex
offender commitnent).
17 See, e.g., State v. Armbrust, 59 P.3d 1000, 1004 (Kan. 2002).
37 See, e.g., State v. C.M., 746 So. 2d 410, 419 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (community
notification law prohibiting juvenile sex offenders from living at home and subjecting them
to notification); Hills v. Iowa Dep't of Transp. & Motor Vehicle Div., 534 N.W.2d 640,642
(Iowa 1995) (drivers' license revocation).
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III. FORTIFYING THE CLAUSE
As the preceding discussion should make clear, despite the unmistakable clarity
of the ex post facto command and the central place the Framers intended the Ex
Post Facto Clause to play in the nation's constitutional democracy, the empirical
record of ex post facto challenges is far from impressive. Of course, in itself, the
low rate of success perhaps should not give rise to concern, or at least surprise,
given the acknowledged institutional aversion of reviewing courts to find
constitutional fault with legislative enactments. 311 At the same time, however, state
courts, during the study period, interpreted and applied the Clause with substantial
disregard for the Framers' acute concern for legislative excess.
A. The Structural Role of the Clause
As the Justices in Calder v. BulP74 were at pains to recognize, criminal laws
have always held special allure for law makers." 5 "If there is any sphere in which
politicians would have an incentive simply to please the majority of voters,"
William Stuntz more recently observed, "it's criminal law."3, 76 For legislators, the
promulgation of criminal laws affords an irresistible chance to align themselves
with the victims of crime and against the criminal element, a compelling political
symmetry accentuated in modem times by the soundbite imagery of the media.377
... See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 386, 399 (1798) (opinion of Iredell, J.)
(noting that judicial authority to invalidate a law is "of a delicate and awful nature," to be
done only "in a clear and urgent case"); see also Robert A. Shapiro, Judicial Deference and
Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656,
690 (2000) (noting in the context of state court constitutional interpretation that "[w]hile
Supreme Court deference to Congress has declined in many areas, state court deference to
state legislatures continues to be strong"); cf Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1156 (2003)
(Souter, J., concurring) (stating that "[wihat tips the scale" in federal courts' deciding
whether a state law is punitive for ex post facto purposes "is the presumption of
constitutionality normally accorded a State's law").
374 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
171 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
376 William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
529-30 (2001).
377 See generally KATHERINE BECKEmr, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN Poircs 14-27, 62-63 (1997) (discussing influence ofpopular
media reports on criminal justice legislation); KATHLYN TAYLOR GAUBATZ, CRIME IN THE
PUBuC MIND 5-8 (1995). As David Garland has noted, "TV has changed the rules of
political speech. The TV encounter-with its soundbite rapidity, its emotional intensity, and
its mass audience - has tended to push politicians to be more populist, more emotive, more
evidently in tune with public feelings." DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME
AND SociAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SocIErY 7 (2001).
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Moreover, legislating in the criminal law arena bears little risk for politicians, as for
the most part those ensnared in the justice system lack political recourse. 7 Given
these realities, it has been argued that the ex post facto ban singles out retroactive
criminal laws for prohibition, not civil ones, because the ballot box can more
possibly protect against governmental arbitrariness in the civil context. 379 That the
ban extends to retroactive laws, in particular, is also explainable in political process
terms. With retroactivity, legislators can single out wrongdoers with greater ease,
such as California did with alleged pedophile Marion Stogner, confident in the
knowledge that the vast majority of voters will herald the targeting.
Amid this powerful motivational dynamic, the Ex Post Facto Clause plays a
crucial role, serving as a check on legislative tendencies to target the politically
unpopular, in particular those suspected or convicted of criminal wrongdoing. It
thus ideally functions, as has been noted by Adrian Vermeule, to promote a "Veil
of ignorance," which guards against legislative overreach motivated by political
self-interest."8 Veil rules, Professor Vermeule observes, suppress self-interest
among decisionmakers "by subjecting [them] to uncertainty about the distribution
of benefits and burdens that will result from a decision., 38' By requiring
prospectivity in criminal lawmaking, the Clause serves to prevent legislators from
battening themselves at the expense of persons ensnared in the criminal process.3 2
If criminal laws are to be enacted, they must apply prospectively, targeting only
potential (not identified) criminals." 3 Veil rules, as Professor Vermeule asserts,
311 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
I" Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive
Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2167 (1996).
30 Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399
(2001) (drawing on the work ofJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 118-23 (rev, ed. 1999)).
31 Id. at 399.
382 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOVAK, TREATISE ON CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.9, at 658 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that a "legislature can
benefit or harm disfavored citizens more easily with retroactive laws than it can with
prospective laws"); see also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (asserting
that the "Ex Post Facto Clause raises to the constitutional level one of the most basic
presumptions of our law: legislation, especially of the criminal sort, is not to be applied
retroactively").
383 According to Professor Vermeule:
The simplest tactic for introducing uncertainty is to entrench a constitutional
requirement that rules be prospective - enacted in advance of the events they
govern. The power of retroactive legislation, for example, enables legislators to
identify the winners and losers from proposed policies - to know who will bear
costs and benefits as well as what those costs and benefits will be. The
opportunities for legislative self-dealing are obvious if legislators can match up
identified winners and losers with past or future friends and enemies,
respectively. Under a prospectivity requirement, however, legislators are hard
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thus supplement separation of power limits that are "the baseline constitutional
strategy for suppressing self-interested decision making."3 4
Seen in these terms, the Court's recent decisions in Carmell v. Texas385 and
Stogner v. California 6 can be said to have re-veiling effects, functioning to
reinforce the structural safeguard assured by separation of powers doctrine." 7 Both
cases served notice on the legislative branches of the states that the Ex Post Facto
Clause, one of the select affirmative limits on legislative prerogative contained in
what Alexander Hamilton referred to as our "limited Constitution," 388 is to be
respected in carrying out their lawmaking function.319 Importantly, moreover, both
put to match up consequences with allegiances, because prediction is
intrinsically more difficult and less certain than backward-looking observation,
and because targets who know of the law will be able to steer clear of its
prohibitions.
Vermeule, supra note 380, at 408. See also Krent, supra note 379, at 2171 (noting that
"[p]rospectivity ensures that the legislature is at least willing to impose punishment on a
larger group of people whose identities are unknown. The generality of the prospective
provision helps prevent singling-out").
114 Vermeule, supra note 380, at 405; see also Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n. 10
(1981) (observing that the Ex Post Facto Clause "upholds the separation of powers by
confining the legislature to penal decisions with prospective effect"). For a similar
application of veil rules, in relation to judicial application of equal protection principles in
particular, see Deborah Jones Merritt, Communicable Disease and Constitutional Law:
Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 739, 787 (1986).
3" 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
386 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003).
387 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (observing that "separation
of powers is a structural safeguard rather than a remedy to be applied only when specific
harm... can be identified. In its major features... it is a prophylactic device, establishing
high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be
judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.").
38 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kranmick ed., 1987)
("By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to
the legislative authority; such, for instance, as it shall pass no bills of attainder, no expost
facto laws, and the like."); see also John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and
Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L. REV. 333, 341 (1998) (observing that
"[a]ffirmative limitations qualify the authority otherwise granted to the legislature, with the
result that even properly enacted ex post facto laws are invalid and legally ineffective, to be
treated by the courts as legal nullities").
389 The tenability of this argument of course largely turns on whether the Court's wisdom
is received by, in Paul Brest's words, the "conscientious legislator," susceptible of heeding
constitutional directives. See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to
Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STANFORD L. REV. 585 (1975). For Supreme Court
pronouncements underscoring the existence of such an expectation, see, for example, Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (noting the expectation that Congress "legislates in the
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decisions did so by underscoring the central role of the Ex Post Facto Clause in
ensuring governmental constraint, independent of notice and reliance concerns (the
latter being of recent jurisprudential vintage)3 90 As noted by the Carmell Court,
"[t]here is plainly a fundamental fairness interest, even apart from any claim of
reliance or notice, in having the government abide by the rules of law it establishes
to govern the circumstances under which it can deprive a person of his or her liberty
or life.""39 Indeed, as the Court noted with respect to retroactive increases in
punishment (Calder category three, the most common alleged violation surveyed
here), "there are few, if any, reliance interests in planning future criminal activities
light of constitutional limitations"); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,575 (1988) (noting that"Congress ... is bound by and
swears an oath to uphold the Constitution," and that therefore the Court "will ... not lightly
assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties").
However, whether the constitutional dictates can prevail over competing political
interests remains an enduring, critically important question. See Brest, supra, at 601 (noting
that "[p]erhaps it is naive to assume that the Constitution will often prevail when political
interests are threatened"); Frederick Schauer, AshwanderRevisited, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 71,
92-93 (1995) (concluding that "given that the American political system does not penalize
legislators for voting for good (in the eyes of voters) policies that are determined by the
courts to be unconstitutional, one would expect members of Congress to be anything but risk-
averse"). For additional discussion in this regard, see Louis Fisher, Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REv. 707 (1985); Abner J. Mikva, How
Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587 (1983);
Mark Tushnet, Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and
Two Informal Case Studies, 50 DUKE L.J. 1395 (2001).
3" The Court's emphasis on notice and reliance first appeared inDobbert v. Florida, 432
U.S. 282 (1977), without precedential support, where the Court held that an invalid death
penalty law served as an "operative fact" and hence alleviated ex post facto concern. Justice
Stevens filed a vigorous dissent in Dobbert, emphasizing the Clause's role as "a barrier to
capricious government action," id. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting), a view that would
resurface twenty-three years later when he authored Carmell. For an extended critique of the
notice and reliance emphasis of Dobbert, echoed in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981)
and Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), see People v. District Court, 834 P.2d 181,
213, 218-25 (Colo. 1992) (Lohr, J., concurring).
391 Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 531,533 (2000); see also Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct.
2446, 2449, 2461 (2003) (emphasizing "fairness" concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause and
stating that "the Clause protects liberty by preventing governments from enacting statutes
with 'manifestly unjust and oppressive' retroactive effects") (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dal.) 386, 391 (1898)); Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 440 (1997) (noting that "the
Constitution places limits on the sovereign's ability to use its lawmaking power to modify
bargains it has made with its subjects"); cf LAURENCEH. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL
LAW 629 (2d ed. 1988) (observing that "regularity - with its associated norms of
prospectivity, generality, and impartiality-serves both to express and to implement ends
quite separate from those of respecting reliance and protecting settled expectations").
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based on the expectation of less severe repercussions. '392 Ultimately, what the
emphasis does is compel the politically difficult, but structurally necessary, judicial
task of second-guessing a legislative decision to value criminal law interests over
the imperative that government exercise restraint in dealing with its citizens.393
Taken together, the Court's recent decisions in Stogner and Carmell, although
both five-to-four majorities, promise to reinvigorate the structural role of the Ex
Post Facto Clause as a constraint on the powerful influences compelling state
legislatures to enact criminal laws with retroactive effect.39 4 With their mutual
Carmell, 529 U.S. at 531 n.21; see also Miller v. United States, 482 U.S. 423, 431
(1987) (rejecting a claim that the Ex Post Facto Clause is satisfied by warning ex ante that
sentencing guidelines are subject to amendment, stating that the ex post facto prohibition
"cannot be avoided merely by adding to a law notice that it might be changed").
Predominant emphasis on governmental fairness, moreover, avoids the unseemly necessity
of honoring an offender's reliance interest, for instance attaching importance to the
possibility that persons such as Marion Stogner might "keep calendars so they can mark the
day to discard their records or... place a gloating call to the victim." Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at
2470 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
'9' See Stogner, 123 S. Ct. at 2461 ("[W]e agree that the State's interest in prosecuting
child abuse cases is an important one. But there is also a predominating constitutional interest
in forbidding the State to revive a long-forbidden prosecution."); see also THE FEDERALIST
NO. 78, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Karmnick ed., 1987) ("Specified exceptions to
the legislative authority... [such as the ex post facto bar] can be preserved in practice no
other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all
acts contrary to the... Constitution void."); cf ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITCS 25, 26 (2d ed. 1986)
(observing that "courts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that
legislatures and executives do not possess," and benefit from an institutional separateness that
"lengthen[s] everyone's view"). In this sense, as John Hart Ely famously observed over
twenty years ago, by guarding against constitutional violations that are unlikely to be rectified
by the ordinary legislative process,judicial review effectively functions to redeem democratic
values. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
87-88 (1980) (characterizing judicial review as "representation-reinforcing").
... In this sense, the separation of powers function of the Ex Post Facto Clause differs
from that of the Bill of Attainder Clause, also contained in Article I. The Attainder Clause
bars legislation, not necessarily of retroactive effect, "that appl[ies] either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315
(1946); see also Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1976) (holding that
legislatures cannot "determine[] guilt and inflict[] punishment upon an identifiable individual
without provision of the protections of a judicial trial"). The attainder bar thus honors
separation of powers concerns by barring legislative usurpation of judicial authority in
individual cases. The Ex Post Facto Clause, on the other hand, bars retroactive criminal laws
of general effect that do not necessarily intrude upon the adjudicative function, yet
nonetheless constitute "arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Weaver v. Graham,
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emphasis on fairness and governmental constraint, in particular, the decisions can
hopefully hasten an era of greater clarity of analytic purpose in ex post facto
jurisprudence. However, as the results outlined above demonstrate, it remains to
be seen whether a similar reinvigoration will occur among state courts.
B. Challenges to Come
To optimize the structural role of the Ex Post Facto Clause as a constraining
influence on legislative excess, the jurisprudence informing it ideally should set
forth clear guidelines to facilitate its application, consistent with its animating
purpose. At present, two major obstacles stand in the way of this: judicial
interpretation of the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause itself, and the enduring
confusion over the extent to which, if any, laws denominated procedural in nature
should come within the ambit of ex post facto protection. This section discusses
these two major areas of uncertainty.
Confusion over the intended scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause dates back to
1798 and the Court's seminal decision in Calder v. Bull, where Justice Chase
identified four categories ofparticular "instances" of ex post facto laws, noting that
"these and similar laws" were of concern to the Framers.39' Over time, the Court
450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981) (citations omitted); see also id. at 29 n.10 (noting that the Clause
helps assure separation of powers by "confining the legislature to penal decisions with
prospective effect").
As a practical matter, the distinction betweenbills ofattainder and ex post facto laws can
dissolve, such as when changes made to the criminal law substantially guarantee conviction
of a specified individual or group of individuals. In such instances, a challenge may succeed
on both grounds, as in Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) and Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867), where the Court invoked both Clauses to invalidate
retroactively imposed loyalty oaths singling out members of particular professions. This
perhaps explains the unfortunate tendency of some to obfuscate the important separation of
powers differences of the respective provisions. In her Carmell dissent, for instance, Justice
Ginsburg wrote that "like its textual and conceptual neighbor the Bill of Attainder Clause,
the Ex Post Facto Clause aims to ensure that legislatures do not meddle with the judiciary's
task of adjudicating guilt and innocence in individual cases." Carmell, 529 U.S. at 566
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 n. 10). Justice Ginsburg's dissent,
moreover, highlights the significance of failing to distinguish the separation of powers
distinctions at play. Having found no notice or reliance interest jeopardized by the Texas
statute challenged, Justice Ginsburg proceeded to discount any separation of powers concern
because there was "no indication that the Texas Legislature intended to single out this
defendant or any class of defendants for vindictive or arbitrary treatment." Id. at 567.
... Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-91 (1798). In essence, the Calder Court
identified what Jed Rubenfeld has called "paradigm cases of a right's applicability," which
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has lent varying weight to the Calder categories, ranging from expansive decisions
that call into question their basic role as a heuristic for implementing the Clause,396
to, as it has more recently, decisions that view the categories as rigidly delimiting
its reach.397 Even when embracing the latter view, however, the Court has managed
to obfuscate matters. Perhaps most notably, in Collins v. Youngblood,39 while
condemning earlier Courts for taking what the majority saw as undue liberty with
Calder, the Court at once prescribed a new category (defenses), deleted two others
(relating to rules of evidence and "aggravation"), and ultimately endorsed what has
been accepted as an essentially two-category standard.3 This, while steadfastly
insisting that "the prohibition which may not be evaded is the one defined by the
Calder categories." ' Sixty-five years before, inBeazellv. Ohio,"' adecisionupon
which the Collins Court heavily relied, and extolled as "faithful to [the Court's] best
knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause," 2 the Court
set forth a three-part test.4 3 Finally, only in 2000 and 2003, with Carmell and
are historic instances courts can use "to illuminate... what particular abuses most provoked
those who framed and ratified the provision in question, and what it was about those abuses
that most provoked them." Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE
L.J. 1119, 1170 (1995). According to Professor Rubenfeld, such cases can play an
indispensable role in constitutional exegesis: "The judiciary gives interpretive content to a
constitutional provision by deriving principles and rules of application that capture the
provision's paradigm cases." Id. The difference with Calder, of course, is that the
paradigmatic "instances" of ex post facto laws identified by Justice Chase have been
employed to delimit the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause itself, not merely to assist
in its purpose-based interpretation.
396 See, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 354 (1898) (reversing conviction of a
defendant who was tried by an eight-person jury because, at the time of his offense, the law
mandated a twelve-person jury), rev'd, Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
391 See, e.g., Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513,525 (2000) (asserting that Calder categories
define the reach of Ex Post Facto Clause); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990);
see also Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446,2462 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Our
precedents hold that the reach of the Ex Post Facto Clause is strictly limited to the precise
formulation of the Calder categories.").
3" 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
3" Id. at 43 ("Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase
the punishment for criminal acts."). See also Cal. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499,
510 n.7 (1995) ("The ex post facto standard we apply today is constant: It looks to whether
a given legislative change has the prohibited effect of altering the definition of crimes or
increasing punishments.").
4 Collins, 497 U.S. at 46.
4o" 269 U.S. 167 (1925).
4o Collins, 497 U.S. at 43.
403 See Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169-70. The Court elaborated as follows:
It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their citation may be
dispensed with, that any statute which [ 1 ] punishes as a crime an act previously
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Stogner, did the Court at long last ascribe constitutional meaning and weight to the
second and fourth Calder categories.
Beyond these troubling inconsistencies, the Court's espoused (albeit
inconsistent) fealty to the Calder categories themselves can only be taken as a
curious incident of constitutional history. Even presuming that they are not mere
"gloss" on the Constitution, and hence unworthy of deference,'" it should be
recalled that the categories, limiting a protection contained in Article I no less,
constituted dictum." 5 More importantly, the procrustean categories themselves
plainly endure in strained relation with the competing premise that the Ex Post
Facto Clause is "levelled [sic] at the thing, not the name. It intended that the rights
of the citizen should be secure against deprivation for past conduct by legislative
enactment, under any form, however disguised."'' The Court's recent decision in
Stogner is illustrative of this tension, where the five-member majority struggled to
situate laws reviving expired statutes of limitations within the Calder categories,
ultimately having to resort to Justice Chase's "alternative description" of the second
Calder category.
4
0
7
To a significant degree, the Court has thus, to borrow a phrase from Akhil Amar
fashioned in another context, adopted a "frozen in amber" approach" to its ex post
facto jurisprudence, evincing a rigid historicism arguably unmatched elsewhere in
committed, which was innocent when done; [2] which makes more burdensome
the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or [3] which deprives one
charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when
the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.
Id.
See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(positing that judges are duty-bound to enforce the Constitution, "not the gloss which [the
Court] may have put on it") (quoting William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLuM. L. REV.
735,736 (1949)); see also Bd. ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245-46 (1991) (stating that
the Court's doctrine should not be treated as though it were part of the Constitution); Graves
v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfi'ter, J., concurring)
("[T]he ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we
have said about it.").
' As Justice Ginsburg noted in her Carmell dissent, "Justice Chase's formulation was
dictum, of course, because Calder involved a civil statute and the Court held that the statute
was not ex post facto for that reason alone." Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 567 (2000)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
4o Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,325 (1866); see also Weaver v. Graham,
450 U.S. 24, 31 (1980) (asserting that "it is the effect, not the form, of the law that
determines whether it is ex post facto").
"o See Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2450 (2003).
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 818
n.230 (1994).
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its constitutional canon.4  This includes, most notably, the closely related Bill of
Attainder Clause,"" the interpretation of which has also been premised on early
dictum from the Court.41' Rather than adhering to a "narrow historic reading" of
attainder, which at common law pertained exclusively to capital sanctions, the Court
instead has broadly construed the Bill of Attainder Clause to apply to any
"legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically designated persons
or groups. 4 2 As the Court emphasized in 1977, its "treatment of the scope of the
[Attainder] Clause has never precluded the possibility that new burdens and
deprivations might be legislatively fashioned that are inconsistent with the bill of
attainder guarantee."4 3
Despite the foregoing, indeed despite the verity that Calder's basic historical
understanding is today widely subject to dispute," 4 the Court must be taken at its
' The Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, for instance, an area where it has paid
frequent lip service to history as a guide for assessing "unreasonable" searches and seizures,
in reality most often reflects the Court's application of modem sensibilities. See Tracy
Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment
History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 926-46 (2002) (discussing the Court's recent
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and noting the same).
410 See supra note 394.
... The seminal attainder case is Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 138 (1810), a
decision addressing the Contracts Clause, where Chief Justice Marshall interpreted attainder
to include more than that known to the Framers - including "pains and penalties" (i.e.,
noncapital sanctions). For a vigorous critique of Fletcher, and the Court's subsequent
departure from the common law understanding of attainder, see Raoul Berger, Bills of
Attainder: A Study ofAmendment by the Court, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 355 (1978).
411 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965); see also United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (stating that "[w]ithin the meaning of the Constitution, bills of
attainder include bills of pains and penalties" (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277, 323 (1866) (emphasis added)).
4" Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. at475 (stating also that "[t]he Court, therefore,
often has looked beyond mere historical experience and has applied a functional test"). For
more on the Court's "functional" approach to attainder cases, see Thomas B. Griffith, Note,
Beyond Process: A Substantive Rationale for the Bill of Attainder Clause, 70 VA. L. REV.
475,477-92 (1984).
414 Perhaps most fundamentally, its assertion that only laws of a criminal nature, not civil,
were of concern to the Framers is now widely questioned. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and
Interpretative Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 519, 578-85 (2003); see also supra note 40.
As Leonard Levy has observed, upon noting the diversity of Framing-era views on the
Clause, "[s]eeking original intent in the opinions of the Framers is seeking a unanimity that
did not exist on complex and divisive issues contested by strong-minded men. Madison was
right when he spoke of the difficulty of verifying the intention of the Convention." LEVY,
supra note 40, at 294-95.
Moreover, the Calder categories themselves, despite being taken as definitive and
exclusive, lack particular support in the historical record. See Oliver P. Field, Ex Post Facto
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word that the Calder categories will endure as the exclusive benchmark for ex post
facto analysis.415 Even so, the continued proliferation of laws impacting the
criminal justice system, including, perhaps most notably, changes in evidentiary
laws with outcome-influencing consequences, will continue to strain the analytic
capacity of courts, and hence function to muddy the waters of the legislative
process.
A second major area of uncertainty stems from the ongoing confusion over
whether laws denominated procedural in nature warrant ex post facto attention,
notwithstanding that Calder itself made no mention whatsoever of the distinction.
The matter promised to be put to rest finally in Dobbert v. Florida416 and Collins v.
Youngblood.4 7 Dobbert, which rejected an ex post facto challenge to changes in
Florida's capital punishment scheme, made clear that "[e]ven though it may work
to the disadvantage of a defendant, a procedural change is not ex post facto."418
Collins rejected a challenge to a Texas law that allowed reformation of an improper
jury verdict without the necessity of remand for retrial, ostensibly attaching
particular importance to whether one or more of the Calder categories is
transgressed,419 not the "label" ascribed to a particular legal change. 420 Having said
this, however, the Collins Court categorized the Texas verdict reformation law as
a "procedural change," and denied relief.42 Moreover, despite overruling two
in the Constitution, 20 MICH. L. REv. 315, 321-22 (1922) (noting that the Convention
debates contain "not a single mention of the practice of the British Parliament to which
Justice Chase referred"). For evidence of this uncertainty, one need look no further than the
majority and dissenting opinions in Carmell and Stogner, which jousted over the proper
interpretation of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British parliamentary enactments. See
Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2455-58 (2003); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513,
548-49 (2000).
"4 If change were to come, it might originate, ironically, from one or more conservative
members of the Court. Justice Thomas, for instance, has signaled his interest in a broader
conceptualization of the Ex Post Facto Clause, at least with respect to its traditional limitation
to retroactive criminal laws in particular. See E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (acknowledging a "willing[ness] to reconsider Calder and its
progeny to deternine whether a retroactive civil law that passes muster under our current
Takings Clause jurisprudence is nonetheless unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto
Clause").
416 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
417 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
418 Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293.
419 Collins, 497 U.S. at 46.
420 Id. (stating that "by simply labeling a law 'procedural,' a legislature does not thereby
immunize it from scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause").
421 id. at 44.
[Vol. 12:439
2004] "DEMOCRATIC DESPOTISM" AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT 505
nineteenth-century decisions finding procedural changes ex post facto,422 it left
intact language in numerous other decisions that attached importance to the onerous
consequences of laws possibly classified as procedural.4 23 Seven years later, in
Lynce v. Mathis, the Court deemed it significant whether a change in the law was
"merely procedural. ' 24 Even more recently, in 2000, the Carmell Court was at
pains to distinguish mere procedural changes from legal changes in evidentiary
rules that "subvert[] the presumption of innocence," with only the latter being
prohibited by Calder category four.
42s
The resilience of the substance/procedure divide, and the analytic appeal of an
amorphous catch-all category that by definition does not warrant ex post facto
analysis, 42 6 is readily apparent in the state court cases surveyed here. Significant
numbers of claims throughout the study period were rejected on the rationale that
422 Id. at 47 (overruling Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), and Thompson v. Utah,
170 U.S. 343 (1898)).
423 See, e.g., Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,29 n. 12 (198 1) (stating that "[a]lteration of
a substantial right ... is not merely procedural, even if the statute takes a seemingly
procedural form"); Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293 (stating that no ex post facto violation occurs
ifa law does not impinge "substantial personal rights," but merely alters "modes of procedure
which do not affect matters of substance") (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171
(1925)); Beazell, 269 U.S. at 170 (stating that procedural laws affecting defendants in a
"harsh and arbitrary manner" are ex post facto); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380,
383-84, 388 (1898) (noting that a procedural change can be invalid when it "alter[s] the
situation of a party to his disadvantage" or "entrench[es] upon any of the essential rights
belonging to one put on trial").
Similarly, language in several of the Court's decisions more generally has attached
significance to the disadvantages associated with challenged laws. See, e.g., Millerv. Florida,
482 U.S. 423,431, 433 (1987) (stating that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits any law that
"clearly disadvantages" or alters a"substantial right"); Lindseyv. Washington, 301 U.S. 397,
401 (1937) (stating that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids criminal laws accruing "to the
detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer"); Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171 (asserting
that the Ex Post Facto Clause "was intended to secure substantial personal rights against
arbitrary and oppressive legislation") (citing Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183
(1915)); Malloy, 237 U.S. at 183 (finding ex post facto laws infringe on "substantial personal
rights"); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1894) (finding ex post facto laws
deprive the person of "substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the
person accused of [the] crime").
424 519 U.S. 433,447 n.17 (1997).
'25 Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513,532 (2000). At the same time, the Court characterized
Collins as attempting to "eliminate[] a doctrinal hitch.., which purported to define the scope
of the Clause along an axis distinguishing between laws involving 'substantial protections'
and those that are merely 'procedural."' Id. at 539.
426 See, for instance, the broad definition offeredbythe Collins Court: procedural changes
refer to "changes in the procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated, as opposed to
changes in the substantive law of crimes." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45 (1990).
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
they work a procedural, not substantive, change in the law. Retroactive changes to
statutes of limitations prior to Stogner, for instance, were regularly upheld against
attack by virtue of their purported procedural nature.42 7 Both before and after
Carmell, moreover, changes to evidentiary laws were designated procedural and
thus upheld, including laws allowing the retroactive admission of victim impact
evidence in capital sentencing proceedings,2 8 and expanded consideration of"other
acts" evidence in trials (especially involving prior alleged sexual abuse).4 9 This,
despite the inescapable inference that such laws patently advantage the state, easing
its path to conviction and punishment.430
In short, the effort to distinguish procedural changes for ex post facto purposes
has certainly "prove[d] elusive," '43I notwithstanding the Court's apparent effort in
Collins to render the distinction constitutionally irrelevant. The upshot of this
confusion is that state legislatures have been afforded another means to avoid the
unambiguous retroactivity prohibition of the Ex Post Facto Clause, allowing them
to indulge their natural political predilection for retroactive laws with criminal
cast.432 Along with the strategic benefit of camouflaging punitive laws as civil ones,
427 See supra note 317 and accompanying text
4 See supra notes 347-49 and accompanying text.
429 See supra notes 350-5 land accompanying text.
430 In this regard, it is instructive to compare such changes to those condoned by the Court
in its two seminal cases illustrative of procedure. In Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), the
Court allowed retroactive application of a law that permitted a convicted felon to testify; in
Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898), the Court approved the use of handwriting
evidence, not previously admissible. To state the obvious, allowing capital jurors to hear
emotional testimony of victims' worth when weighing death, and allowing jurors to consider
of prior crimes or bad acts, especially of a sexual nature, likely have a considerably greater
bearing on justice outcomes.
41' Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,433 (1987); see also Murphy v. Kentucky, 465 U.S.
1072, 1073 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting "evident
confusion" among courts in drawing distinction); Carper v. W. Va. Parole Bd., 509 S.E.2d
864, 868 (W. Va. 1998) ("Just what alterations of procedure will be held to be of sufficient
moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition cannot be embraced within a formula or
stated in a general proposition. The distinction is one of degree.") (citation omitted).
This same line-drawing challenge of course has bedeviled federal courts for years in the
context of choice-of-law determinations, an expansive body of law benefitting from no
greater degree of certainty. See generally PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 2-31 (4th ed. 1998). Similar
difficulties are evidenced in habeas corpus jurisprudence, where courts struggle to determine
whether a ruling announces a "substantive" change in law, requiring its retroactive
application to cases on collateral review. See generally 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S.
LIEBMAN, FEDERALHABEAS CORPUS PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE § 25. 1, at 1030-32 (4th ed.
2001 & Supp. 2003).
432 See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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which functions to avoid ex post facto coverage altogether, 3 legislatures wishing
to pass retroactive criminal laws have every incentive to package and portray laws
as procedural. The effect, ultimately, is to undercut the constraining structural force
of the Ex Post Facto Clause, allowing application of laws, in James Madison's
words, that "are contrary to the first principles of the social compact and the every
principle of sound legislation.,
434
IV. CONCLUSION
The temptation for state legislatures to pass criminal laws with retroactive effect
is age-old and, if recent history is to serve as a guide, will not abate any time soon.
The Ex Post Facto Clause, as Chief Justice Marshall observed not long after the
4' A ready example of this phenomenon is the effort by state legislatures to codify
involuntary commitment provisions for "sexually violent predators" in various noncriminal
parts of their codes, thereby militating against ajudicial finding that the laws are punitive for
ex post facto purposes. In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), for instance, the Court
inferred a nonpunitive purpose because Kansas labeled its law a "civil commitment
procedure," and relegated it to the innocuous confines of the probate code. Id. at 361
(asserting that the state's "objective to create a civil proceeding is evidenced by its placement
of the Act within the [state's] probate code, instead of criminal code") (citations omitted).
If a law is deemed facially nonpunitive, a petitioner must adduce the "clearest proof that the
law in either "purpose or effect" contradicts such "manifest intent." Id. (citing United States
v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)). For criticism of this deferential standard as being
contrary to the exacting judicial scrutiny required by the Ex Post Facto Clause, see Wayne
A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1261, 1289-91 (1998).
The Court's recent decision inSelingv. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001), in turn, serves to
enhance the significance of the threshold judicial determination of whether a particular
sanction is nonpunitive for ex post facto purposes. In Young, the Court rejected an "as
applied" challenge to a law, previously deemed nonpunitive for ex post facto purposes,
characterizing it as "unworkable." Id. at 263. As a result, the determination of whether a law
is punitive for ex post facto purposes turns on the assessment of the nature of the law itself,
without regard for how the law is subsequently implemented. Id. at 262-63; see also id. at
269 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that ex post facto analysis turns on legislative purpose and
the "effects apparent upon the face of the statute"). For discussion of Young and the unique
interpretative work of courts in asessing ex post facto, as opposed to substantive due process
challenges, see Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the
Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CoNN. L. REv. 319, 336-37
(2003).
434 THEFEDERALJSTNO. 44, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (acknowledging that the "Ex Post Facto
Clause raises to the constitutional level one of the most basic presumptions of our law:
legislation, especially of the criminal sort, is not to be applied retroactively").
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nation's formation, was designed to guard against such laws, inspired by the
"feelings of the moment" and the "sudden and strong passions" that can beset
legislative bodies.435 The Court's recent decisions in Carmell and Stogner appear
to signal a new determination that the judiciary seek to ensure that the government
play "by its rules" in the criminal justice arena, despite the compelling social and
political reasons favoring retroactive application of criminal laws.436 In so doing, the
Court, albeit in both cases by a five-to-four vote with distinctly different majorities,
heeded its own critically important admonition that the applicability of a particular
constitutional provision should turn on the "reasons" it was included in the
Constitution and "the evils it was designed to eliminate." '
For civil libertarians, this determination can only be taken as surprising but very
good news, given the Rehnquist Court's more typical hands-off attitude in relation
to state crime control efforts. Indeed, this attitude has resulted in the recent
undercutting of other constitutional limits applicable to such state activity, the Due
Process Clause and Eighth Amendment in particular, elevating the role of the Ex
Post Facto Clause to even greater significance than before. In terms of due process,
in 2001 the Court significantly curtailed constitutional limits on the kindred
authority of courts to apply their criminal law decisions retroactively to the
disadvantage of defendants,3" which will surely make due process claims even
more difficult to sustain.439 In terms of the Eighth Amendment, earlier in 2003,
before Stogner was decided, the Court upheld California's uniquely draconian
"three strikes" sentencing law, confirming that for all intents and purposes the
Amendment exercises no durational constraint on the capacity of state legislatures
to imprison offenders.' 0
41' Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38 (1810).
411 Quoting Joseph Story at the end of its opinion, the Carmell majority emphasized the
basic constitutional value judgment that courts must enforce when evaluating the
constitutionality of retroactive criminal laws:
If the laws in being do not punish an offender, let him go unpunished; let the
legislature, admonished of the defect of the laws, provide against the commission
of future crimes of the same sort. The escape of one delinquent can never
produce so much harm to the community, as may arise from the infraction of a
rule, upon which the purity of public justice, and the existence of civil liberty,
essentially depend.
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 552-53 (2000) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTrrUTION § 1338, at 211 n.2 (Lawbook Exchange 2001) (1858)).
4" United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,442 (1965).
438 See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 462 (2001).
431 See Harold J. Krent, Should Bouie Be Buoyed? Judicial Retroactive Lawmaking and
the Ex PostFacto Clause, 3 ROGER WIL.IAMS U. L.REv. 35,57-77 (1997) (surveying cases,
pre-Rogers, and noting that successful due process claims are "few and far between").
"o See Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1190 (2003).
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The relative uniqueness of the Court's recent treatment of the Ex Post Facto
Clause, by conservative and liberal justices alike, might ultimately be explained by
not just its storied history but also its palpable explicitness, compared to other
potentially constraining but more indeterminate provisions, such as the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment."' However, as the
Court's decisions demonstrate, and the results and rationales of state courts
surveyed here underscore, the scope of protection afforded by the Ex Post Facto
Clause is far from clear-cut, and considerable work remains to be done if it is to
serve as the constitutional bulwark envisioned by the Framers.
"I U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
